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Rethinking Constitutional Interpretation to
Affirm Human Rights and Dignity
by VINCENT J. SAMAR*

Introduction
This article will show that debates over the two most common
approaches to constitutional interpretation, Originalism and living
constitution, are both theoretically and practically open to challenges from
those who believe either approach is undemocratic or provides insufficient
protection for minority rights. Given these challenges, a new approach is
needed: one that provides constitutional viability in the present age without
opening the Constitution to any fad of interpretation. The Supreme Court
needs to have available a method of interpretation that is respectful of the
past without being tied to it, so as to meet current challenges to our evolving
understanding of human rights.
Constitutional interpretation proceeds on the assumption that the
Constitution remains binding law. That assumption, I will argue, requires
privileging human rights if most Americans are to continue to find
legitimacy in the Constitution’s status as higher law. Current theories of
constitutional interpretation have either largely failed to account for the
document’s continued, cross-generational legitimacy or have widened
interpretation as to effectively nullify any work the document might perform.
Originalism, for example, interprets the Constitution in an attempt to affirm
what the Framers would have most likely expected to be the consequences
of their writings. Few Supreme Court decisions utilize this approach, and it
is almost entirely nonresponsive to changes in social and economic
conditions during the last century. The living Constitution approach follows
a common law-like approach, which means the Court may merely appeal to
custom or precedent to create constitutional change, effectively adjusting the

* Vincent J. Samar is a Lecturer in Philosophy and an Associate Faculty Member at Loyola
University Chicago Graduate School, and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. The author would like to express his thanks to Professor Mark Strasser of
Capital University Law School for his comments on an earlier version of this article.
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language to resolve current issues, even if the adjustment results in distortion
of the language. Arguably, by using this method of interpretation, the Court
fails to ascribe any significance to the document’s actual language or original
purposes. In the view to be expressed here, tradition continues to play a role,
but not-so-rigidly as to disavow new ways of reconstructing past
determinations so as to legitimately respond to important social and cultural
needs. Human rights serve as the glue for binding the different
interpretations together under a higher-ordered set of values, whether by
adoption of amendments or Court interpretations. Since a philosophical
grounding for human rights can be found in our common understanding of
human freedom and well-being, it stands to reason that this foundation, along
with its criteria for resolving conflicts of rights, is a viable way to avoid the
most obvious difficulties with the current theories.
It should be noted that my approach is both systematic and narrowlyfocused. First, it is systematic because it searches for the common thread
between the preferred interpretation of the Constitution and why most
Americans continue to find this interpretation to be legitimate. Second, my
approach is narrowly-focused because it is designed to set forth a method of
constitutional interpretation that is neither limited to only past intentions nor
so open-ended as to support virtually any fashionable, value-laden trend.
Protecting indispensable human rights will sustain the centrality of the
document to the American experiment.
Section 1 will review the varied, specific modalities the Supreme Court
has adopted over the past two-and-one-quarter centuries of interpreting the
Constitution to meet changing conditions. Section 2 explores the
shortcomings of the two most prevalent background normative theories of
interpretation–Originalism and living Constitution–that have animated
Supreme Court opinions, but do not provide a clear moral direction for future
interpretations. Section 3 discusses how the theory of the social contract,
when developed into a tradition capable of framing duties incumbent on
future generations, might explain the Constitution’s legitimacy today.
Section 4 notes how the Court, at times through its decisions, aided the
Constitution’s continued legitimacy by gingerly navigating between
opposing concerns for continuity and for change, which inevitably arise
when tradition must govern the present. Together, Sections 3 and 4 establish
the need for an approach to constitutional interpretation that is dynamic
enough to meet changing conditions, yet sober enough to recognize past
contributions. Section 5 identifies human rights as deriving from two
sources: (1) some rights originate from the Framers’ beliefs at the time of the
creation of the Constitution and its subsequent amendments, and (2) other
rights are those recognized today as human rights by many nations, including
the United States. Section 6 follows by addressing concerns about
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indeterminacy entering constitutional interpretation when new values are
added on to those rights already recognized. Section 7 provides the antidote
to indeterminacy by requiring all human rights to be founded upon voluntary,
purposive human action; this will avoid transactional inconsistencies when
applied; and should support the long-term well-being of all persons. Finally,
Section 8 completes the work of this Article by showing how the proposed
change to constitutional interpretation affirms human dignity, which the
Supreme Court has previously acknowledged as an important constitutional
value. A brief conclusion then follows.

I. Modalities Recognized by the Supreme Court for Interpreting
the United States Constitution
In 1991, Phillip Bobbitt identified six modalities that the Supreme Court
recognized for interpreting the United States Constitution.1 By a “modality,”
Bobbitt meant a “way in which we characterize a form of expression as
true.”2 The Supreme Court uses modalities to justify its interpretations of
the Constitution.
Modalities are important because they set out the true conditions for an
interpretative proposition. For example, Bobbitt notes that “[a] historical
modality may be attributed to constitutional arguments that claim that the
[F]ramers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended, or did not
intend, or that it cannot be ascertained whether it was their intention, to
protect pregnant women from state’s coercion . . . to bear children.”3 In Roe
v. Wade, for example, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Majority, expressed
concern that the various uses of the word person in the United States Bill of
Rights did not indicate a postnatal being from which he concluded that “[a]ll
this, together with our observation . . . that throughout the major portion of
the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they

1. PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (the modalities are
historical, textual, structural, prudential, doctrinal, and ethical).
2. Id. at 11. For example, Bobbitt notes a logical modality, is “attributed to the proposition,
p, by saying that it is logically necessary or contingent or logically impossible, that ‘p.’” Id. In
other words, there are certain conditions for determining where a statement is true: either it is true
tautologically by virtue of what it says (like “there are or are not 5 people in the room”) or it is true
contingently from facts we discover (“Mary wore a turtleneck to work today”), or it is not possible
to be true as in the case of a contradiction (“it is and is not raining here now”). Bobbitt notes how
“knowledge engages the force of logic” when “an epistemic mode” is employed “[t]o say that it is
known or unknown or known that it is not true that ‘p[.]’” Id. This contrasts with saying that p,
“is obligatory, permissible or forbidden,” which is to signal “a moral or deontic mode” or to say
that p “is now or will be” . . . . “[a]temporal modality.”
3. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
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are today, persuades us that the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn.”4
Bobbitt identifies the historical modality used, for example, by Justice
Roger B. Taney in the Dred Scott case, as an “originalist position.”5 An
Originalist position considers what the Framers intended to convey and
potentially what they anticipated would be the result of their conveyance
when they wrote the Constitution and its subsequent amendments. It thus
draws on the historical mode in that its focus is on intent that must be proved
by use of historical sources. An example of this, cited by Bobbitt, is found
in Justice Taney’s now infamous Majority Opinion in the Dred Scott case.6
Taney wrote, in determining whether Article III’s diversity jurisdiction
extends to former slaves:
It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were the
citizens of the several [s]tates when the Constitution was adopted.
And in order to do this, we must recur to the [g]overnments and
institutions of the thirteen colonies . . . . We must inquire who, at
that time, were recogni[z]ed as the people or citizens of a [s]tate,
whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English
government; and who declared their independence and assumed
the powers of [g]overnment to defend their rights by force of arms
. . . . We refer to these historical facts for the purpose of showing
the fixed opinions concerning that race, upon which the statesmen
of that day spoke and acted.7
Obviously, the use of the historical modality, prior to the adoption of the
post-Civil War Reconstruction amendments, would likely operate, as it did
in Taney’s Opinion, to reaffirm the lack of citizenship rights of AfricanAmericans. I will return to discussing these human rights concerns in
Section 7.
The second modality is a textual modality.8 Bobbitt writes, “[a] textual
modality may be attributed to arguments that the text of the Constitution
would, to the average person, appear to declare, or deny, or be too vague to
say whether, [for example,] a suit between a black American citizen resident
in a state and a white American citizen resident in another state, is a

4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
5. BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 13.
6. Id. at 13 citing 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
7. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407, 409 (1856).
8. BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 14.
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‘controversy between citizens of different states.’” Noting the difference
between a contemporary meaning of these words and the meaning Justice
Taney ascribed, “[o]ne should not be tempted to conclude, however, that
textual approaches are inevitably more progressive than originalist
approaches[;]” indeed, a textual approach “can be a straitjacket, confining
the judge to language that would have been different if its drafters had
foreseen later events.”10 Consider Justice William H. Taft’s concern in a
wiretapping case, allegedly involving a violation of the Fourth Amendment
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]”11 Justice Taft wrote:
The [a]mendment itself shows that the search is to be of material
things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects . . . . The
[a]mendment does not forbid what was done here. . . . There was
no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of
hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses . . . . The
language of the [a]mendment [cannot] be extended and expanded
. . . .12
Would the Framers have truly intended to exclude listening in on a private
conversation if they could have foreseen how technological advances would
make this an effective tool for law enforcement? When considering a
textualist approach, this should be a guiding question.
Bobbitt’s third modality, structural modality, arises in a context that
turns out [with only slight changes to include electronic emails] to be very
contemporary: “can a court issue a subpoena (or should it enjoin some other
subpoena) for the disclosure of the President’s working notes and diaries?”13
He notes, “[t]o say that the institutional relationships promulgated by the
Constitution require, or are incompatible with, or tolerate a particular answer
to this question is to use a structural mode of argument.”14 As an example,
Bobbitt cites “McCulloch v. Maryland, . . . [which] relies almost wholly on
structural approaches . . . [i]n determining whether a Maryland tax on the
Federal Bank of the United States could be enforced[.]’”15 Bobbitt notes that
“Chief Justice Marshall studiedly refuses to specify the particular text that

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 14 (emphasis added).
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1928).
BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 14.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15 (citing McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 317-26 (1819)).
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supports his argument, and explicitly rejects reliance on historical
arguments, preferring instead to state the rationale on inferences for the
structure of federalism.”16 Because structural arguments are less intuitive
than arguments based on text or history, Bobbitt notes that:
Usually, arguments in this modality are straightforward: first, an
uncontroversial statement about a constitutional structure is
introduced . . . . [“The States have no power, by taxation, or
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress, to carry
into effect the powers vested in the national government.”[a.]];
second, a relationship is inferred from this structure . . . . [“This
principle does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the
Bank of the United States, in common with the other real property
in a particular State, nor to a tax imposed on the proprietary interest
which the citizens of that State may hold in this institution….”[b.]];
third, a factual assertion about the world is made . . . . [“Nearly
each succeeding Congress, if not every one, has acted and
legislated on the presumption of the legal existence of such a
power in the government . . . . The executive government has acted
upon it; and the courts of law have acted upon it.[c.]] Finally, a
conclusion is drawn that provides the rule in the case. [“[Congress]
has established a bank; and before the act establishing it can be
pronounced unconstitutional and void, it must be shown, that a
bank has no fair connection with the execution of any power or
duty of the national government, and that its creation is
consequently a manifest usurpation.”]17
Bobbitt’s fourth modality is from a prudential point of view. Here, Bobbitt
notes that “the dramatic national crises of the depression and world war soon
provided ample reason to introduce the practical effects of constitutional
doctrine into the rationales underpinning doctrine:”18

16. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 16. The bracketed quotes are this Article author’s choosing of language from
McCulloch v. Maryland, 317 U.S. 316 (1819), to illustrate Bobbitt’s four points of a structural
argument. They appear in this footnote as lettered indentions below:
a. McCulloch, 317 U.S. at 317
b. Id.
c. Id. at 323.
d. Id. at 326.
18. BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 16.
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For example, one such case arose when, in the depths of the
midwestern farm depression, the Minnesota legislature passed a
statute providing that anyone who was unable to pay a mortgage
could be granted a moratorium from foreclosure. On its face such
a statute not only appeared to realize the fears of the framers that
state legislatures would compromise the credit market by enacting
debtor relief statutes, but also plainly to violate the Contracts
Clause that was the textual outcome of such concerns. Moreover,
the structure of national economic union strongly counseled against
permitting states to protect their constituents by exploding a
national recovery program that depended on restoring confidence
to banking operations. Nevertheless[,] the Supreme Court upheld
the statute, observing that: An emergency existed in Minnesota
which furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved
power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community.19
Bobbitt’s fifth modality derives from caselaw when lawyers make appeals
“in a doctrinal mode.”20 The questions he points to here is: “[C]an a state
constitutionally aid parochial schools” by providing school students a cash
allowance for their transportation, or would such aid “offend the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment . . . .[?]”21 Bobbitt notes that
the caselaw has “developed a three-prong test: (1) does the state program
have a secular purpose; (2) is its principle effect neither to advance nor
inhibit religion; and (3) does its administration excessively entangle the state
in religious affairs?”22 Bobbitt writes, “[a]pplying this test to the question
above, the judge might write: ‘Everson must be distinguished from the
instant case because the program in Everson provided transportation
common to all students, whereas here only some students—the parochial
ones—are given cash allowances.’”23 Alternatively, a judge might decide
that “Everson, which also involved public transportation to parochial school
students, governs this case. Here as there, the state’s program provides aid
to students and their parents, and not—as in cases that have applied Everson
and struck down state assistance in this area—direct assistance to churchrelated schools.”24 The doctrinal modality does not state which of these two
interpretations is correct but, rather, allows the Court the opportunity to
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 16-17.
Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
Id. at 19.
Id.
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adopt either position, so long as the adopted position can be fitted into the
caselaw that has come before.
Bobbitt’s last modality is an ethical modality.25 As Bobbitt writes,
“[t]his form of argument denotes an appeal to those elements of the
American cultural ethos that are reflected in the Constitution. The
fundamental American constitutional ethos is the idea of limited
government, which presumptively holds that all residual authority remains
in the private sphere.”26 Bobbitt offers a hypothetical to show the basic
pattern of such arguments. South Carolina offered three convicted sex
offenders a choice between a thirty-year prison sentence or drug-induced
castration. The hypothetical continues:
Suppose a convicted man accepted the bargain and was released
on probation terms that incorporated this pledge (as by druginduced impotence). Then suppose that he ceased taking the
prescribed drug. If his probation were revoked, a constitutional
challenge to the terms of his probation might take this form:
1. The reservation to the individual of the decision to have
children is deeply rooted in the American notion of
autonomy; there is no express constitutional power to
implement a program of eugenics.
2. Moreover, such programs are not a conventionally
appropriate means to any express power.
3. Those means denied the federal government are also denied
the states.
4. The South Carolina sentence amounted to ordering a man to
comply with eugenics scheme that deemed him ineligible
to procreate.27
The example Bobbitt uses is particularly interesting because it focuses on the
personal autonomy of the individual, and how ensuring certain civil liberties
protections guards this autonomy. It is fair to say that what Bobbitt is
expressing here, and what has been expressed in a variety of Court cases—
from Pierce v. Society of Sisters,28 to Griswold v. Connecticut,29 to Roe v.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 19.
Id.
Id. at 21.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Wade, to Lawrence v. Texas, and to Obergefell v. Hodges, just to name
a few—will become central to my argument, infra Section 6, that human
rights should become a determinative factor for constitutional
interpretation, ranking higher than all other modalities in an assessment of
constitutional value.
However, a concern arises from Bobbitt’s presentation. The truth of
propositions of law are fundamentally different from propositions of logic.
Whereas propositions of logic can be found to be apodictically true based
on meanings alone, propositions of law, like propositions of experience,
require a background framework for why they should be adopted. This is
particularly evident with the doctrinal modality, but also present in the
historical, textual, prudential, and ethical modalities. Indeed, propositions
of law, even more than propositions of experience, require, in addition to
how our experiences may have changed, a normative background
framework of politics for why they ought to be accepted. That is, legal
propositions do not simply affirm some fact or set of facts as true, but
instead, rely on existing normative obligations incumbent on those who
interpret the law for what is to be done or not done.33 This is why law
cannot be assumed to be a command from some sovereign backed by a
threat, but must instead, even from a positivist point of view, engage a
normative reason for what is to be upheld.34

II. Originalism Versus the Idea of a Living Constitution:
A Question of Political Morality
The previous section focused on seven modalities the Court has adopted
in its interpretations of the United States Constitution. What is of interest
regarding these alternative modalities is how they are themselves justified
by a framework of constitutional interpretation. Recall that because they
involve norms, they do not stand as true propositions on their own like

30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
31. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
32. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
33. This idea that law piggybacks on an already existing normative obligation can be traced
back to Plato, who in the Crito, has Socrates, his protagonist, defend his decision not to escape
from the prison by appealing to background moral ideals of fair play, gratitude, and consent to
justify his obedience to an unjust law of Athens. See PLATO, CRITO 45b, 48c, 49d, 50b, 50c-e, 52bd (Project Gutenberg 1999).
34. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 82-91 (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 2nd ed.
1961) (disagrees with Austin’s positivism that law operated as a command backed by a threat
because that would not distinguish being obliged, as when a gunman says your money or your life,
from having an obligation).
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35

modalities of logic. Logical modalities would fit any possible world one
could conceive. Legal modalities, including the ones the Court has adopted
for constitutional interpretation, are like the modalities of science, contingent
on fitting into the actual world in which the law operates. In that world, one
needs to ask, what is the goal to be achieved by the choice of modality?
Inevitably, the goal will be connected to the values thought to be important
to constitutional order. Thus, the modes reside within a framework of
political morality in which our duty to obey the law subsumes what we take
the law to legitimately require.36 The modes of interpretation do not function
independently of the political morality adopted by society, but rather as
consequences of that political morality. Only interpretations that can be
justified within a reasonable scheme of political morality can serve as a
source of law.
Professor William Eskridge identifies the different canons and norms
commentators have used for discerning constitutional meaning.37 These
canons overlap with the modalities previously described by Bobbitt for
understanding what the Constitution prescribes. But even more than those
modalities, Eskridge’s canons beg the question: why these canons? In other
words, they are not just another name for the modes the Court has adopted
to interpret the law, but should be seen as transitions from the various
theories of political morality to what the law requires. They include:





Ordinary [original] meaning of constitutional language as it
would have been understood by average Americans at the time
of adoption;
Structure of the Constitution as a presumptively coherent plan
for the Union, tied together by fundamental principles and
policies that, in turn, provide a context for applying the
Constitution;
Legislative history of the Constitution and its amendments
especially state ratification debates, but also (by some
accounts) the drafting deliberations at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787 and in Congress (for the amendments);

35. See BOBBITT, supra note 1.
36. Elsewhere I have described this framework as a global map in which the duty to obey the
law is discovered “not in an analytical understanding of what the law is but by way of a normative
understanding of how actions of political institutions are justified.”
37. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES
AND THE CONSTITUTION 363 (2016).
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Executive departmental interpretation, especially relevant
where there has been legislative deliberation and acceptance
or acquiescence; and,
Background meta-norms reflected in the common law
tradition and law of nations.38

Individually, each canon provides grounds for why it should be
followed. Undoubtedly, litigants who stand to benefit from the application
of a specific canon in a particular case or set of cases will argue for its
adoption. However, it is unclear from the list how the various canons ought
to be prioritized or when they should be applied. If the Court is free to choose
among the different canons or norms, and if the Court chooses to affirm one
side or the other in a particular litigation, what will prevent the choice from
being arbitrary or biased?39 The choice of canon or norm must be based on
more than its service in affirming a particular interpretation. It must also be
based on rational grounds supporting a reasonable understanding of society’s
political morality. Reasonable in this context means that the society’s own
view of its political morality may not be enough to justify its choice of canon,
unless the canon is also capable of being reproduced by the best system of
political morality available. Thus, the Court should inquire into society’s
political morality as part of its duty to follow higher law if majoritarian
biases do not carry the day.40 Recall, one of the reasons the Framers agreed
to adopt a Bill of Rights was to offset the argument that the Constitution may
be used by a majority to enforce its own will to the detriment of minority and
states’ rights.41 As a consequence, commentators like David Strauss, the late
Justice Antonin Scalia, and Ronald Dworkin, among others, have focused
their arguments less on the choice of canon, and more on the political
philosophy that provides the basis for the choice.
David Strauss, who supports the idea that the Constitution is a living
document, has noted:

38. ESKRIDGE, supra note 37, at 361-63 (footnotes omitted).
39. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the death
penalty, as applied, was arbitrary and possibly discriminatory against minority groups in violation
of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits against “cruel and unusual
punishment.”
40. See THE FEDERALIST 51 (Madison) at 321 (discussing how a system of checks and
balances in republican government can serve not only to check the growth of factions, but to ensure
“the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.”).
41. THE BILL OF RIGHTS, American Government, U.S. HISTORY (June 22, 2019),
http://www.ushistory.org/gov/2d.asp (“In 1789, Virginian James Madison submitted twelve
amendments to Congress. His intention was to answer the criticisms of the Anti-Federalists. The
states ratified all but two of them . . . as the Bill of Rights . . . .”).
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The written Constitution is a short document that has been
amended only a handful of times. By comparison, the United
States has over two centuries of experience grappling with the
fundamental issues—constitutional issues—that arise in a large,
complex, diverse, changing society. The lessons we have learned
in grappling with those issues only sometimes make their way into
the text of the Constitution by way of amendments, and even then
the amendments often occur only after the law has already
changed. But those lessons are routinely embodied in the cases
that the Supreme Court decides and also, importantly, in the
traditions and understandings that have developed outside the
courts.42
Strauss’ emphasis on the role of judgment when the words in the
original document or its amendments cannot be reduced to a simple reading
is significant because, unlike the reading of a statute, constitutional
arguments should by the Preamble of the Constitution serve to “establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity…”43 In this respect, understanding constitutional law
requires much more than an understanding of the words of the various
Articles in the original document and its subsequent amendments; it requires
an understanding of the precedents the Court has “shaped by notions of
fairness and good policy” as those precedents are arguably what makes the
Constitution viable today.44 Strauss describes this legal approach as the way
the “common law” has operated for centuries, “long before there was a
written U.S. Constitution.”45 But the approach stands for following the
political morality at the heart of the tradition, which requires courts to
consider the justice and fairness of each application, even though the
approach itself does not offer concrete criteria for determining justice or
fairness. In this sense, the interpretative tradition that has animated
American constitutional law fails the positivist test of pedigree since every
constitutional decision of the Court will not necessarily rest its grounding on
the specific intentions or purposes of the Framers. Oftentimes, the Court will
find it necessary to inquire into the political morality of the subject itself.

42.
43.
44.
45.

DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 34-35 (2010).
See id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 36.
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Strauss uses an example from contract law to illustrate common law
innovations46 in the line of privity of contract cases beginning with
Winterbottom v. Wright,47 and continuing through to MacPhearson v. Buick
Motor Company.48 In Winterbottom v. Wright, Winterbottom was employed
by a company providing Postmaster General drivers to deliver mail.49
Wright was under contract with the Postmaster General to provide and keep
the coaches used by the Postmaster General in good working order.50 After
Winterbottom suffered injuries from a latent defect in the coach he was
driving, he attempted to sue Wright for nonfeasance of his contract with the
Postmaster General.51 The Court of the Exchequer held that, in the absence
of a contract between Winterbottom and Wright, Winterbottom’s lawsuit
could not go forward.52 The principle of law that emerged from this case
was that one could not maintain a suit for nonfeasance absent privity of
contract.53 Ten years later, in the New York case Thomas v. Winchester,54
Mrs. Thomas was erroneously prescribed a medicinal, extract of dandelion.55
Due to a mislabeling by the manufacturer, Winchester, the pharmacist,
mistakenly issued Mrs. Thomas extract of belladonna, a known poison.56
When the manufacturer appealed to nonsuit the case, the New York State
Court of Appeals held that suit could proceed because putting a mislabeled
bottle of medicine on the market was “inherently dangerous,”
notwithstanding the lack of contract between the parties, as it was unlikely
the mislabeling would be discovered before causing injury.57 In effect, the
no-privity principle was now subject to an exception for inherently
dangerous items. Finally, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,
defendant, MacPherson, purchased a Buick motor car from a retail dealer.58
Defendant suffered injuries when the wheel on his automobile collapsed, and
sued the manufacturer for negligence.59 In holding that the defendant’s suit

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 80-85.
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
Id. at 402-03.
Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
Id. at 404-05.
Id. at 405.
6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
Id. at 398.
Id.
6 N.Y. 397 at 409.
MacPherson, 217 N.Y. 384.
Id. at 385.
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could proceed, Judge Benjamin Cardozo, writing the Opinion for the court,
noted that the manufacturer had reason to know a negligently produced
automobile would cause harm, as well as that the product would ultimately
be sold to a dealer and consumer, neither of whom would be expected to
inspect it.60 In effect, what had been the exception to the no-privity rule in
Thomas, was now the rule in MacPherson, and the previous no-privity rule
was now the exception.61
On the surface, this line of cases appears reasonable, and the results are
fair and just. Manufacturers should not be able to avoid liability to the
ultimate consumer by placing products on the market that are likely to have
undiscovered defects, which could be defective and cause serious injuries. 62
Yet one could still ask whether the Courts’ sense of justice in these cases is
related to anything firmer than the arbitrary whims of judges, even if
holdings encapsulate what most people believe to be fair. Indeed, realist
Justices, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, believe that the law of a case is
simply what the judges are willing to do to resolve controversies.63 But even
if that is true for common law tort and contract cases, and even if the court
decisions in those cases appear quite satisfying to the general public, the lack
of any bright-line rule for how these issues are to be determined or the weight
to be assigned to particular concerns, provides courts with little direction,
especially where the issues themselves are often unclear and the
constitutional structure for the separation of powers seems absolute. Thus,
before committing to a full-fledged acceptance of the living Constitution
approach, it is necessary to further investigate the spectrum of political
morality behind the Constitution to better understand the ideal interpretation.
This need for further investigation is most apparent in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s now iconic decision, Brown v. Board of Education.64
Professor Strauss noted:

60. Id. at 389.
61. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 25 (1949).
62. STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 84 (Strauss states that “Cardozo was, therefore, in a position
to argue that his ultimate conclusion—that the privity regime should be discarded in favor of a
simple requirement of foreseeability—not only was good policy but was implicitly supported by
several decades’ worth of decisions.”).
63. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap
Press 1963) (1881) (As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has stated: “The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.”).
64. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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We know from private papers that several justices who were
part of the unanimous Court in Brown were initially unsure
of what to do because, while they individually opposed
segregation, they were at least initially troubled about
whether the Court could lawfully declare segregation to be
unconstitutional. Herbert Wechsler, a law professor who
helped the civil rights lawyers prepare their case in Brown,
later wrote that Brown could not be justified in principle
legal terms.65
Nevertheless, Strauss goes on to point out that:
Today, Brown is not just accepted; it is an icon. The lawfulness of
Brown is a fixed point for the mainstream legal culture. Anyone
who doubts that Brown is lawful is a fringe player, at best. It is, for
example, inconceivable that anyone could get appointed, or
confirmed, to a federal judgeship if it became known that he or she
thought that Brown was unlawful.66
Strauss further comments that “any theory about the U.S. Constitution must
explain, and justify, Brown.”67 But the Fourteenth Amendment does not
speak on racial equality. Instead, Originalists make odd use of history to
narrow this bit of language to reflect a different view, which they could have
directly expressed at the time. If the Framers intended to afford equal
protection specifically for matters of racial equality, they possessed the
writing abilities to express what they meant. Their failure to do so not only
gave rise to the Court’s later decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,68 (now dead as
a precedent post-Brown) but, nevertheless, indicated what they may have
expected to be the consequences of what they wrote. Recall that the Framers
of the original Constitution of 1787 provided that slavery should be a
continued practice, at least until 1808,69 suggesting that they understood that
future generations may reconsider the consequences of Originalist decisions.
The notion that the Framers would leave some questions open only to
be resolved by the developing political morality of society is also found in
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 77-78.
Id.
Id. at 78-79.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
U.S. CONST. art. V.
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70

punishments.”
Does the definition of cruel and unusual punishments
depend only on what the Framers of the Eighth Amendment considered to
be cruel and unusual in 1791, or is it open to the interpretation of Americans
in the 21st century? There is evidence that what the Framers thought to be
cruel and unusual punishments at the time was less derived from a true
Originalist understanding of their own legal history, and more a political
point of view regarding the anticipated perception of how they foresaw
future generations defining cruel and unusual punishments.71
The particular question for the current generation arises in the context
of the imposition of the death penalty. But, if the Eighth Amendment’s
meaning is open to what today’s Americans consider to be “cruel and
unusual,” Originalists will ask: in what sense does the Constitution in
general, and the Bill of Rights in particular, protect other areas of minority
rights from the influences of different combinations of factions forming the
majority? These kinds of concerns may explain why Originalists will often
advocate for a narrower interpretation of the Constitution’s meaning, based
on the understanding of the Framers at the time of enactment.
Originalists, in contrast to those who adopt the “living,” common law
approach to constitutional interpretation, share the core idea “that when we
give meanings to the words of the Constitution, we should use the meanings
that the people who adopted those constitutional provisions would have
assigned.”72 To the Originalist, changes to traditions and understandings are
less important than preserving what the authors of the words meant when
they wrote, for example, the Eighth Amendment. In effect, they determine
what would follow, unless the Constitution was amended through the process
described in Article V, which would change the actual language of the
document.73 Consequently, with regard to the aforementioned death penalty
example, Originalists argue that if the authors of the Bill of Rights did not
consider the death penalty to be cruel and unusual in 1791, then it should not
be considered cruel and unusual today. For Justice Scalia, a self-proclaimed
Originalist, the living Constitution approach does “not seek to facilitate
social change but to prevent it” by constitutionalizing contemporary trends
in our understanding of the language, thus bringing the issue outside the

70. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
71. Cf. Anthony F. Granucci, No Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 865 (1969) (arguing that the American Framers of the Eighth
Amendment misinterpreted Blackstone and early English law by proscribing "not excessive but
torturous punishments”).
72. STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 10.
73. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 36-37.
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74

democratic process. Is Scalia correct that if the Court follows an Originalist
position, it must necessarily leave in place the right of the states and the
federal government to decide whether to continue the death penalty for
certain crimes? Scalia himself acknowledges, “I do not suggest, mind you,
that Originalists always agree upon their answer. There is plenty of room
for disagreement as to what the original meaning was, and even more as to
how that original meaning applies to the current situation before the court.”75
Professor Ronald Dworkin identifies one place for disagreement as the
words the Framers chose when drafting the Eighth Amendment. Dworkin
distinguishes “semantic originalism” from “expectation originalism.”76 The
former “insists that rights-granting clauses be read to say what those who
made them intended to say.”77 The latter “holds that these clauses should be
understood to have the consequences that those who wrote them expected
them to have.”78 The two understandings are not the same, as words can
have a broader intension from the extensional objects one might expect them
to apply to, not to mention the fact that the intension might change over
time.79 Dworkin goes on to explain:
Consider, to see the difference, the Brown question: does the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of “equal protection of
the laws” forbid racial segregation in public schools? We
know that the majority of the members of Congress who
voted for that amendment did not expect or intend it to have
that consequence: they themselves sustained racial
segregation in the schools of the District of Columbia. So
an expectation-originalist would interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment to permit segregation and would declare the
Court’s decision wrong. But there is no plausible
interpretation of what these statesmen meant to say, in
laying down the language “equal protection of the laws,”
that entitles us to conclude that they declared segregation

74. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 42 (1997).
75. SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL C OURTS AND THE LAW, supra
note 74, at 45.
76. Ronald Dworkin, Comment on ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 119 (1997).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. “Intension” refers to a word or phrase’s meaning, rather than the psychological state of
the author. Extension, by contrasts, refers only to the objects subsumed by the word or phrase. See
Intension and Extension: Logic and Semantics, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/topic/intension (last visited June 22, 2019).
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constitutional. On the contrary, as the Supreme Court held,
the best understanding of their semantic intentions supposes
that they meant to, and did, lay down a general principle of
political morality which (it had become clear by 1954)
condemns racial segregation. So, on that ground, a
semantic-originalist would concur in the Court’s decision.80
Similarly, a semantic-originalist would adopt a different position from
an expectation-originalist regarding the Eighth Amendment. Consider what
Dworkin says are two different accounts of what “the Framers intended to
say in the Eighth Amendment:”81
The first reading supposes that the Framers intended to say,
by using the words “cruel and unusual,” that punishments
generally thought cruel at the time they spoke were to be
prohibited—that is, that they would have expressed
themselves more clearly if they had used the phrase
“punishments widely regarded as cruel and unusual at the
date of this enactment” in place of the misleading language
they actually used. The second reading supposes that they
intended to lay down an abstract principle forbidding
whatever punishments are in fact cruel and unusual. Of
course, if the correct translation is the first version, then
capital punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
But if the second, principled, translation is a more accurate
account of what they intended to say, the question remains
open.82
Why does the question remain open if the second version is correct?
Because, even from an Originalist position, the Framers’ use of abstract
versus more concrete language suggests that they intended for consideration
of what punishment qualifies as “cruel and unusual” in light of changing
understandings of justice and fairness, human psychology, and social
climate. So, contrary to Originalist presumptions, Originalist thinking will
not always, or even mostly, lead to what the Framers expected. Nor is it by
any means clear that Originalism will be better equipped to protect the rights
of minorities than the more common law-like, living Constitution approach.
As Dworkin points out,

80.
81.
82.

Dworkin, supra note 76, at 119 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 483).
Id. at 120.
Id.
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[m]any conservative judges therefore reject semantic
originalism as undemocratic; elected judges, they say, should
not have that responsibility. Scalia gives nearly the opposite
reason: he says the moral reading gives the people not too
little but too much power, because it politicizes the
appointment of Supreme Court justices and makes it more
likely that justices will be appointed who reflect the changing
moods of the majority. He fears the constitutional rights of
individuals will suffer.83
Justice Scalia suggests that the moral reading of the Constitution allows for
potential tyranny of the majority to offset individual rights of the minority.
Undoubtedly, Justice Scalia is concerned about property rights, which have
been diminished since the advent of the New Deal.84 However, Dworkin
views the situation differently. He writes:
History disagrees [with Scalia’s position]. Justices whose
methods seem closest to the moral reading of the
Constitution have been champions, not enemies, of
individual rights, and, as the political defeat of Robert
Bork’s nomination taught us, the people seem content not
only with the moral reading but with its individualist
implications.85
Neither position provides a clear, knock-out win for “which individual
rights are genuine and important and about whether the moral reading is a
threat or an encouragement” because, “in the end the magnet of political
morality is the strongest force in jurisprudence,” and that magnet may
operate in different directions.86
Where does this leave the discussion of the two most common forms of
debate about the correct approach to constitutional interpretation? Arguably,
each approach has something unique to offer, yet each is both theoretically
and practically open to various challenges from those who believe it either
undemocratic or insufficiently capable of protecting minority rights.
Originalism, in the narrow sense of expectation-Originalism, may protect
those who fear that current coalitions of majorities may undermine
previously acknowledged rights they hold dear. However, expectation-

83.
84.
85.
86.

Dworkin, supra note 76, at 126.
See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 74, at 41-42.
Dworkin, supra note 76, at 126-27.
See id. at 127.
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Originalism runs the risk of being unable to account for the Framers’ use of
abstract language in some constitutional provisions, and concrete language
in others. It also ignores the very real possibility that the Framers believed
this difference was necessary in order to protect basic rights and values
enshrined in abstract language from being circumscribed by a particular
historical point of view.
Here, the idea of a living Constitution can be used to ensure the
evolution of rights and values that adjust according to changing political,
cultural, and moral understandings. The question is: whose rights and which
values are ensured by the Constitution? There is also the argument that
suggests resolving changing viewpoints by way of the supermajority Article
V amendment process, which avoids the possibility of a tyranny of the
majority. Problematically, the Article V amendment process can be thwarted
by momentary legislative majorities, whose preferences are not always likely
to consider the basic rights of individuals recognized by the best of society’s
current political, cultural, and moral understandings. Moreover, it tends to
be a long-drawn-out process for issues that might have an immediate impact
on individual lives.87 However, use of Article V seems necessary to repeal
either an original Article or an Amendment, since those are at the heart of
the Constitution.88
Therefore, a new kind of interpretation is needed: one chosen to
secure the legitimate interests of those minorities who may not receive
majority favor, which, more often than not, are presented in individual cases
where basic rights are supremely vulnerable to societal indifference. As it
stands, neither approach provides a complete and morally satisfactory
formulation of what should accompany judgments about constitutional
matters, let alone why such judgments should matter, given that those who
wrote the Constitution and Bill of Rights are long since dead. Thus, if the
Constitution and Bill of Rights shall continue to function as higher law that
influences modern day America, it is urgent to consider, as a possible
foundation for the interpretivist question, the origin of constitutional
authority.

87. Most pertinent to this Article are issues involving women’s reproductive rights, marriage
equality, racial discrimination, and sex discrimination.
88. See Vincent J. Samar, Can A Constitutional Amendment Be Unconstitutional?
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.667, 687-94 (2008). Contra YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS 82-100 (2017). (It is
unclear, however, if an amendment could legitimately repeal any fundamental rights that are a part
of the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment, since these constitute not only an essential part
of what the Constitution stands for, but also, as human rights, are themselves part of higher law.).
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III. Social Contract as the Forerunner of a Tradition
Why should Americans care about the intent of those who wrote the
Constitution more than two-and-a-quarter centuries ago, or those who wrote
the Fourteenth Amendment a century-and-a-half ago? It is quite common to
think of the Constitution and the Amendments following it as setting forth
the social contract among “We the People” for how the Government of the
United States and the various state governments operate. The problem with
this view is that social contract theory fails to explain, beyond the first
generation, why subsequent generations should be obliged to follow the
directives of those who are now long since dead.89 Indeed, none other than
Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, questioned
“whether one generation of men has a right to bind another.”90 Jefferson
goes on to argue that if generations are defined to exist only for a set time,
no debt assumed by one generation could be passed on to a future generation
which had not agreed to the obligation.91 His argument extinguishes the
claim that society could impose this obligation based on an original Lockean
natural right; Jefferson identifies the practical constraint that each
generation, as a whole, is granted by nature only a specific finite time for its
existence.92 Consequently, nature and the rights of nature seem to prevent
any such obligation from being passed on to subsequent generations.
On the contrary, one might argue that since whole generations do not
simply die out at a specific time, society may be represented by an
overlapping consensus of those members who accede to the previous
obligations. Even if this were the case, would the obligation only go so far,
and no farther, than those who had accepted the previous obligation? This
is not a matter of adopting an amendment, but of reaffirming what is already
in place.93 Continuation of constitutional authority is part of the background
framework of the tradition under which the Constitution operates, as well as
why major changes in structure ought to require an amendment. More
importantly, since that tradition has continued, at least in its broader
structural aspects, from generation to generation, with Supreme Court

89. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-75 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (In the Second Treatise, Locke presents his social contract theory. He
begins by noting that “Men being … by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put
out of his Estate, and subject to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent.”).
90. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 488 (Random House, N.Y., 1944).
91. Id.
92. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), supra note 91, at 488.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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94

decisions adjusting only its details, while the various amendments adjust
its larger scope and promise (especially the Reconstruction Amendments), 95
that tradition should now also be seen as constituting a significant part of the
American identity.96
Still, Jefferson’s point extends beyond whether past financial debts
might be honored in the future. He was more concerned with the structure
and obligations imposed by the Constitution, as well as the meanings and
intent of those who authored it. Indeed, the basic structures of the
government, along with the reasons for its creation—to provide a system of
checks and balances, to ensure federal separation of powers, and to guarantee
a substantial degree of state sovereignty—can be found in the arguments
leading up to the Constitution’s ratification.97 However, the values under
which those systems operate have undergone profound changes, especially
with the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments at the end of the Civil
War, which brought onto the national stage, in varying degrees at different
times, a much greater emphasis on individual freedom and equality that
would obligate the states as much as the federal government.98 In part, this

94 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
95 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 58 (1991) (The American Constitutional
Historian, Bruce Ackerman, has described the American Constitution as comprising Three
Republics: “the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal,” the Reconstruction period being
defined by passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.).
96 The argument is that the Constitution becomes a part of the American ethos, so long as it
continues to be seen as legitimate because it is grounded in a set of values Americans respect as
important. That way of looking at legitimacy is significantly different from the way Max Weber
considered legitimacy. The justification for the original constitution and the subsequent
amendments, especially the Reconstruction Amendments, might be grounded on the social contract
created between the then living members of society or their representatives as set out in Articles V
(amendments) and VII (ratification) of the U.S. Constitution. That much fits Max Weber’s notion
of a legal “rational ground” originally affording legitimacy to the Constitution and its subsequent
amendments. See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 215, 217-220 (Guenther Roth and
Claus Wittich eds., 1978). But, as this Article hopes to show, that legal rational grounds
explanation of Constitution’s legitimacy breaks down when the members to the original social
contract or the social contract that gave birth to the Reconstruction Amendments are no longer
alive. In these instances, for the Constitution to continue to remain legitimate, a different notion of
legitimacy will be required. The notion presented here allows for the creation of a tradition capable
of adapting to a changing world by the inclusion of additional human rights norms that that are
themselves respected, even though they may affect the importance of norms already present. This
is not Weber’s “traditional grounds” approach, which demands personal loyalty to persons within
an “immemorial tradition.” But cf. id. at 215, 226-27. As a consequence, the approach here will
require an appeal to a still higher set of moral norms so that it does not just become a peg-board for
posting any values that gain popular attention.
97 See generally 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand
ed.,1937) (providing information that helped frame the Constitution for submission to the states).
98 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. A brief review of how the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause would come to be seen as a basis for ending segregation,

(DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2019]

10/29/2019 10:47 AM

RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

105

is related to the changing role of the United States Supreme Court, which has
evolved from its original emphasis clarifying the boundaries of federalism to
what, following the Great Depression and the New Deal, has become an
institution set upon protecting individual rights more broadly, the latter in
keeping with the Fourteenth Amendment right to ensure equality under the
law.99 The Court’s willingness to back away from just emphasizing the
preservation of state rights and the individual civil rights of white men
produced a shift in interpretation toward paying greater attention to the rights
of women, illegitimate children, and gays and lesbians, as well as showing
respect for a larger federal role of securing the general welfare, even when
this meant placing less emphasis on protecting previously important property
rights.100
Precisely how these new arrangements became a part of the American
legal and political landscape is interesting given the ever-widening
consensus required by the country’s expansion and population growth, as
well as the United States becoming an ever-growing political and economic
player in the 21st century. Currently, the country’s two major oceans no
longer provide the security or isolation from the world’s problems that may
have existed at an earlier time. Today, what happens economically on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange affects what happens in the economic markets of
London, New York, and Chicago.101 Nor is the United States unaffected by

and later be adopted to guaranteeing equal protection for women, as well as gays and lesbians, will
be set out in Section 6. See infra Part 6.
99. See U.S. v. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (noting “here may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth”).
100. John Locke, whose writings strongly influenced Thomas Jefferson, held the natural rights
view that upon birth “every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to
but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in [common to
everyone], he had mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his Property.” LOCKE, supra note 89, § 27. This view, when interpreted by libertarians,
undercuts government regulation of private property that might be aimed at protecting the health
and safety of workers. This is because, under Locke’s view, government is limited to protecting
those pre-political rights afforded in the state of nature. See Lockner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(holding a New York statute that limited bakers to a 40-hour work week violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). But ought this to be the whole of government’s
responsibilities when the Constitution itself states that government is established “to promote the
general Welfare.” U.S CONST. pmbl. See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
(upholding the constitutionality of state minimum wage legislation).
101. See Stock Exchanges Around the World, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest
opedia.com/financial-edge/1212/stock-exchanges-around-the-world.aspx (last visited May 29,
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terrorism, whether global or domestic, or climate change, also caused by
human pollution entering the atmosphere, especially from newly developing
industrial nations, like China.103 Additionally, with the arrival of the global
internet, the relative physical isolation caused by its two oceans no longer
secures the United States from outside threats (putting aside its shared
borders with Canada and Mexico) because hackers residing anywhere in the
world can potentially cause great harm to the United States infrastructure
(such as its electrical grid104), but also, and perhaps more importantly, to its
democratic system of politics.105
Social contract theory, when considered within a tradition that
reconstructs the past to accommodate living in an ever-changing economic
and political world, can set out purposes and obligations that respond to
Jefferson’s concern because it finds a common denominator to operate
between generations. Tradition serves as the common denominator by
allowing for a higher-ordered connection to emerge between what came
previously and what is common and necessary today. Whereas, at one time
it may have been thought that the values that separate higher law from
ordinary law set forth a clear boundary between the Constitution and
statutory law, that boundary is not impervious to outside pressures from realworld conditions. The requirement that any change to basic structures
preserve liberty and equality is the protection higher law affords, both by
way of the formal amendment process and by requiring courts to be
cognizant of values that could be supported by a populace with various
political ideologies.106
2019); see also Economy: Impact of the World Economy, THEUSAONLINE.COM, https://www.
theusaonline.com/economy/world-economy.htm (last visited May 29, 2019).
102. See Part IV: What is the threat to the United States Today? In Terrorism in America After
9/11, NEW AMERICA, https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threatunited-states-today/ (last visited May 29, 2019); see also Natasha Bach, Domestic Terrorism is on
the Rise. But How Prepared is the U.S. to Counter It? FORTUNE (Apr. 4, 2019), http://fort
une.com/2019/04/04/dhs-domestic-terrorism/.
103. See Scott Moore & Michelle Melton, China’s Pivot on Climate Change and National
Security, LAWFARE (Apr. 2, 2019, 2:43 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-pivot-climatechange-and-national-security.
104. Danny Bradbury, Electrical Grid Hacking Makes US Top Threat List, INFOSECURITY
MAGAZINE: INFOSEC BLOG (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/infosec/elec
tricity-grid-hacking-makes-us-1-1/.
105. Frances Robles, Russian Hackers Were ‘In a Position’ to Alter Florida Voter Rolls, Rubio
Confirms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/us/florida-russiahacking-election.html.
106. This process can be illustrated by compromises agreed to by both major political parties
since the Twelfth Amendment requires “a majority of the whole number of the Electors appointed”
to elect the President; otherwise the choice will be made by the House of Representatives. U.S.
CONST. amend. XII.
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Jefferson’s concern is the traditional contract law point we met in
Winterbottom v. Wright, namely, that absent privity of contract, no
obligations exist under a contract.107 However, one must not overlook the
work done by Jefferson’s very explicit example: in a normal contract, either
party can assign their rights under the contract to other persons including
future generations.108 They cannot assign their obligations and liabilities to
third parties without the third parties’ consent, since such a transfer would
constitute a novation requiring new consideration.109 Consequently, under
Jefferson’s example, the rights the Framers agreed to are assigned to future
generations, but any obligations or duties are not. However, in reality, whole
generations do not enter into and exit existence at a single moment in time.
There will always be people to convince each subsequent generation of the
benefit to be gained by continuing the social contract, at least regarding its
most important obligations. Moreover, there will be obligations that arise
outside the contract as we saw in the Thomas and MacPhearson cases.
Together, both intergenerational effort and the emergence of new
obligations, give rise to a cross-generational recognition of a political
tradition that strongly affirms maintaining much of the prior social contract,
but only if adjustments can be and are, in fact, made to meet changing
conditions.
Cross-generational traditions are culturally well-known, as they are
commonly exhibited through customs and beliefs that connect different
generations together.110 This applies to family, religion, and culture, but can
also be associated with other kinds of norms that afford stability, meaning,
and security.111 The idea that people regularly associate together by way of
a tradition is a familiar concept, and serves as a basis to develop one’s own
identity as a member of a family or community.112 Perhaps more
significantly, each new generation finds its own identity, inevitably creating
conflicts due to changed circumstances or new challenges, which require
rethinking old ways of accommodation, and developing new strategies for

107. See 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
108. Richard Stim, What is an Assignment of a Contract? What Happens When Rights and
Duties Under a Contract are Assigned to a Third Party? NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/assignment-of-contract-basics-32643.html (last visited May 26, 2019).
109. See Novation, FARLEX, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreediction
ary.com/novate (last visited May 26, 2019).
110. See Chelsey Byers Gerstenecker, Family Life: Traditions, Customs Help Strengthen
Families, Communities, NEWS-GAZETTE (Nov. 27, 2018), http://www.news-gazette.com/livi
ng/2018-11-27/family-life-traditions-customs-help-strengthen-families-communities.html.
111. The Effect of Family Culture on Family Foundations, COUNCIL OF FOUNDATIONS,
https://www.cof.org/content/effects-family-culture-family-foundations (last visited May 21, 2019).
112. See id.
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managing various situations.
If the tradition is to maintain continuity
between generations, the tradition must adapt to new challenges, and not
hold fast to past expectations. This does not mean giving up all past values
and structures, but instead accommodating those values and structures to the
new challenges presented. Most values and structures allow for this, if
perceived as part of the larger normative system in which they operate. Of
course, if this is to occur, the values of the tradition must not be too
historically confined, nor the structures so rigid as to prevent innovation.
A better approach to constitutional interpretation is thus needed; one
that must connect current and future generations by appealing to some
further set of norms that also constitute higher law. Tradition will be part of
this effort, but only insofar as it provides a place where one’s identity with
the past remains relevant. This requires that the tradition be able to answer
two very pressing questions: First, must American identity necessarily be
associated with having a connection to the past? Second, given tradition’s
role in the development of an identity, exactly how far should the past remain
relevant today? Does the tradition extend, for example, to past expectations
for what “should” be done, even if those answers are no longer thought
helpful to resolving current needs? Are there beliefs that are so deeply rooted
in the tradition that one’s identity with the tradition cannot be maintained
without those beliefs? Of course, if no change is possible, and the reasons
for accepting past beliefs are few, if at all, there is a high likelihood that the
tradition will simply die off.
These questions are at the heart of both the Jeffersonian problem
previously described, and the broader concern of this Article to determine
the obligations that the Constitution and its amendments impose on society
today. The latter is relevant because Congress’ authority, to make laws that
society is legally obligated to obey, is limited by the authority assigned to it
under the Constitution. A tradition is capable of affording such respect for
higher law, provided the higher law is made adaptable to the present.
Beyond those who merely adopt the tradition, how can a tradition
legitimately claim to impose an obligation on others who may not support
it? This is where legitimacy comes in: it is absolutely essential that enough
members of society still perceive themselves as being bound to a certain
tradition they continue to find valuable, such that they are willing to assert
their collective authority to impose that tradition on others to ensure
conformity.
Such a strong-armed approach of forcing tradition onto others will only
make sense in a situation where the approach serves some higher good, such

113.

See The Effect of Family Culture on Family Foundations, supra note 111.
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as getting at truth or achieving justice and fairness. But such higher goods
must then fall outside the specific constitutional tradition in something still
more general and universal that is capable of justifying the tradition at hand.
This second-level higher tradition provides what might be claimed as moral
reasons for any determination offered at the first-level, including, in some
cases, reasons for not following the original tradition, or at least not
following it too closely if justice or fairness are not obviously assured.
Essentially, the obligation to be part of a tradition then may itself require a
higher-ordered explanation residing outside the tradition if it is to avoid
serious moral criticism. If so, the second-level higher-ordered explanation
may set the boundaries of the tradition it also justifies. Arguably, this is the
place where universal morality and universal human rights ought to be
considered, as will be described below. For now, when considering the
duties a constitution imposes on a society, it is worth noting a remark by
Professor Lon Fuller, that:
No written constitution can be self-executing. To be
effective it requires not merely the respectful deference we
show for ordinary legal enactments, but that willing
convergence of effort we give to moral principles in which
we have an active belief. One may properly work to amend
a constitution, but so long as it remains unamended, one
must work with it, not against it or around it. All this
amounts to saying that to be effective a written constitution
must be accepted, at least provisionally, not just as law, but
as good law.114
If constitutions are accepted in a way that is similar to that of traditions, then
this analysis does much to explain why present-day Americans continue to
find the Constitution authoritative. On reflection, what is followed by the
overwhelming number of society’s members, absent overt coercion, is
thought, at least provisionally, to be good, and more so if it allows for further
molding to meet unexpected challenges. This is not to say that having a proattitude need be the only basis for identifying with a tradition, but it
motivates members of a society to follow a tradition.
The pro-attitude idea also does much to explain the broad bipartisan
support of the rise of the regulatory state in the first-half of the 20th

114. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 72 HARV. L. REV.
630, 642 (1958) (arguing against Professor Hart’s thesis for a separation of law and morals in
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958)).
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century.
The idea behind the original Constitution was to make
“lawmaking cumbersome, representative, and consensual” because this was
thought necessary to protect liberty in the nineteenth century; “the regulatory
agency was a workaround to make lawmaking efficient, specialized, and
purposeful,”116 because this was necessary to accommodate welfare in the
20th century. Both views were ways for the Constitution to alleviate fears
of an overzealous, strong, central government, while simultaneously meeting
its Preamble requirement to “promote the general Welfare.”117
Since the pro-attitude idea is manifested in following a tradition that
affords it sanctity, logically, it will want to consider past understandings but
not limit itself to any specific past interpretation. As the philosopher Joseph
Raz has noted, constitutions are viewed as legitimate, or “self-validating,”
provided “they remain within the boundaries set by moral principles.”118
This occurs when the interpretations represent what is worthy of moral
attention because it seems to focus on the most important interests of
society’s members.
David Strauss brings this point home to Originalists with his historical
discussion of James Madison decidedly supporting the Second Bank of the
United States.119 When Alexander Hamilton first proposed the Bank of the
United States, Madison vehemently opposed, arguing that the Constitution
did not authorize such an expansion of federal power.120 Madison said, at
the time, that any alteration in the Constitution would be a usurpation if not
accomplished through Article V:
After an extensive debate on its constitutionality, Congress
enacted legislation establishing the bank. When the term of
the First Bank of the United States expired, Congress rechartered it. Madison, then president, vetoed the bill rechartering the bank—but explicitly on non-constitutional
grounds. By now it was 1815, twenty-five years after
Hamilton first proposed the bank, and Madison explained
that he considered the issue of constitutionality to be
“precluded…by various recognitions under varied

115. Christopher DeMuth, The Regulatory State, NATIONAL AFFAIRS (2012), https://www.na
tionalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-regulatory-state.
116. Id.
117. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
118. JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW
AND PRACTICAL REASON 348 (2009).
119. STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 123-25.
120. Id. at 123.
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circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
Government, accompanied by indications, in different
modes, of a concurrence in the general will of the nation . .
. . A year later, Madison showed his endorsement of the
living Constitution was not empty when he signed the bill
creating the Second Bank of the United States.”121
What Strauss perceives as Madison’s evolution toward a living Constitution
perspective could easily fit the view offered here, of a Constitution capable
of innovation, but grounded in a set of binding human rights principles.
Indeed, the modern regulatory state, which finds no antecedent language in
the Constitution, but is the source of much federal power, is illustrative of a
transmission of legislative authority by Congress to agencies, to set up and
protect the economic and financial needs of the nation.122 The Court’s
decisions that upheld this transmission, as well as those that extended basic
rights to new classes of individuals, provide another example.123 Despite
these congressional and judicial changes in direction, and the public’s
subsequent acceptance of those changes, a kind of schizophrenia in
American psyche remains that animates ongoing political debate
surrounding these questions. For example, most Americans believe federal
employees “who work for federal regulatory agencies do the best they can to
impose the rules and regulations fairly and impartially,” yet still an
overwhelmingly high number of Americans hold the view “that top leaders
of regulatory agencies use their power to pursue personal agendas.” Sixtyseven percent believe regulators and “big businesses” work together in ways
that are harmful and unfair to consumers.124 Since most of these concerns
fall within congressional oversight, this difference in public attitude should
have no constitutional significance. Once again, innovations continue to
resolve and sometimes create current challenges while keeping faith with
past limitations. When combined with the Court’s recognition of current
serious needs, such innovations as the creation of the regulatory state, or the
Court’s recognition of a right to privacy that protects a woman’s right to
terminate a pregnancy, or an expansion of the fundamental right to marry to
include same-sex couples, are still found to be constitutionally salient. This

121. STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 123-24.
122. See STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 121.
123. See id. at 125-26.
124. Scott Rasmussen, Americans Continue to Reject Regulatory State, REAL CLEAR POLITICS
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/01/24/americans_continue_to_r
eject_the_regulatory_state_139264.html.
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provides the framework for how the Court’s present perception of the
underlying human rights purposes of the Constitution may be seen as having
evolved from its original Preamble goals to answer the question: How is
American identity necessarily connected with the past?
The answer to the second question of how far the past should remain
relevant is more complex. It presupposes not merely the existence of a proattitude for following the Constitution and its subsequent amendments and
Court interpretations between generations, but the need for specific
limitations as to what rights warrant constitutional protection, and how
various structures might accordingly be adjusted. This is an important and
separate question from whether identity needs to have a connection to the
past, since it challenges exactly how far the past operates to frame our
identity, while incorporating the reason why we care about constitutional
interpretation from the first question. Most Americans view the Constitution
as legitimate higher law, provided it evolves to meet current challenges to
our institutions and our abilities to govern ourselves as autonomous
individuals. The second question is also problematic because people will
often find that they differ, based on their own world views, on which values
they believe should gain constitutional recognition and how they should be
prioritized when in conflict with other values. Phrases like “due process,”
“equal protection,” or “cruel and unusual punishment” certainly call for
moral attention at what was earlier described to be a higher-level of concern
regarding matters of justice and fairness, but exactly what attention needs to
be afforded to meet the higher-level concern must be carefully scrutinized.
How the Framers viewed extending these terms to meet various challenges
may not presumptively mirror what present-day Americans see as necessary,
or even that all present-day Americans agree on what concerns these terms
should address. Although the concept may be the same, its conception need
not be.125

IV. Continuity and Change
The aforementioned urgent desire for continuity in community life
underlies the continuing authority of constitutional traditions. Such
traditions will often look to the past to affirm present action. To the extent
that such traditions have goals, or at least attempt to resolve uncertainties,
they are likely to govern in their wake. Regardless, majoritarian agreements
will often operate only in the short-term, especially when new and perhaps
125. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (1971) (footnote omitted) (For example, in
discussing justice in the context of institutions, John Rawls distinguishes “the concept of justice as
distinct from the various conceptions of justice and as being specified by the role which . . . these
different conceptions have in common.”).
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unexpected concerns arise along with important issues not readily resolvable
by constitutionally-provided rights or structures. This itself requires a
discussion about the effectiveness of existing rights and structures in
responding to needed and often unexpected changes in daily life, which may
have been precipitated by technological improvements or significant cultural
changes.126 In such circumstances, if the background rights and structures
allow for the needed change to occur, there is no constitutional crisis.127 But
where the background structures do not readily allow for adjustment in the
way the community operates, the constitutional tradition must provide for an
alternative procedure or suffer a loss of legitimacy.128
Following the procedure in the Article V provision of the United States
Constitution may be all that is necessary to resolve the challenge.129
Provisions such as Article V, however, can be clumsy and take a long time
to achieve results, or even fail to achieve any results because of
disagreements over what rights and structures should govern based on
potential interpretations.130 Moreover, there may be a strong desire to see
how the proposed change would benefit the constitutional system before any
formal adoption under Article V. If so, a Supreme Court interpretation that
precipitates what the proposed amendment would accomplish may provide
an opportunity to gain the information sought. More importantly, if the
change achieves vast support among the populace following the
interpretation, use of the Article V procedure may not be needed, as the
change will have become part of the background tradition. In effect, the
Article V provision may only be required for implementing changes
necessary to resolve controversies where there is a current wide division of
public opinion. For example, the controversies over slavery that gave rise to

126. Alison Frankel, A Supreme Court Case Has Internet Companies Running Scared,
REUTERS (DEC. 13, 2018, 1:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-halleck-firstamend
ment/a-supreme-court-case-has-internet-companies-running-scared-idUSKBN1OC2XR (A case
currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court raises the question: Can a private company “face
First Amendment liability as a state actor because they provide a forum for public speech?” More
directly, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584, reified an important change in the background culture by
affording constitutional recognition to same sex marriage.).
127. Separation of Powers - An Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS
(May 1, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-anoverview.aspx.
128. FOREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 4 (1985) (Constitutional historian Forrest McDonald points out that, at the time of
the founding “though virtually every American believed that property and liberty were both natural
and civil rights, it transpired during the Constitutional Convention that delegates had very different
understandings of all five of the words set here in italics.”).
129. U.S. CONST. art. V.
130. STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 19-20.
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the Civil War were settled only with the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment.131 The point of emphasizing ‘wide division of opinion’ is to
avoid failing to make important changes, because initially a majority of the
population may be uncertain whether a change is needed or exactly what the
change should be. Thus, the study of constitutional law is a study of not just
the original document and its amendments, but more importantly, what the
Constitution requires according to the interpretations of the Supreme Court.
The above discussion of my two questions should further the
understanding of the debate between so-called ‘Originalists,’ and those who
believe in a living Constitution that adapts to new circumstances by way of
a common law approach. The former group wants to assert some protection
against short-term majorities who may unduly trample what is perceived as
pre-political rights of minorities; the latter group often wants to be able to
advance protections for those who were previously unprotected.132 These
schools of thought lack a way to guarantee protections of basic rights while,
at the same time, allowing for the expansion of existing rights into new,
previously uncharted, areas. Still, this is not an insurmountable problem
because the nature of law itself often provides opportunities to resolve such
problems.
One of the most important legal tools is language. The language of
legal argument provides a framework for discerning the purposes behind any
law before the law is applied. This is shown in Justice Scalia’s example of
the use of textualism in federal statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia makes
the point that “a text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be
construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it
fairly means.”133 Justice Scalia uses this method as a basis for his criticism
of the Court’s holding in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,134
where a federal statute prohibiting the “importation or migration of any alien
. . . into the United States . . . under contract or agreement . . . to perform
labor or service of any kind in the United States” was held not to apply to
bringing a pastor from England because the Court thought the statute was
meant to limit only “manual labor.”135 The statute provided an exception for
“actors, artists, lecturers, and singers,” but the Court did not rely upon any
of these, making, according to Scalia, Congress’ adoption of these

131. See 13th Amendment, HISTORY.COM (May 16, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/
black-history/thirteenth-amendment.
132. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988).
133. SCALIA, supra note 74, at 23.
134. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
135. Id. at 463.
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exceptions “utterly inexplicable” if they were not going to limit the statute’s
application.136 Instead, the Court attempted to look at why the statute was
enacted. Since a pastor might have been brought under the exception for
“lecturers,” this may have been an unnecessary move by the Court. But even
if so, it does not follow that Justice Scalia’s inference should prohibit courts
from ever going beyond the four corners of the statutory language or to
consider why the statute was adopted. When deciding a case where statutory
intent is at stake, it may be necessary to understand what problem the
Legislature was attempting to resolve.137 Dworkin uses Justice Scalia’s
example of a person who says, “I admire bays,” and asks: does the person
“admire certain horses or certain bodies of water”?138 Without some
investigation into the intent, the correct understanding cannot be ascertained
from the face value of the words. Similarly, in legislation, invoking the
phrase “using a firearm” to enhance the penalty in a criminal statute that
prohibits trading in illegal drugs could mean “only in situations in which a
gun is used as a threat” (a likely concern of a legislature), or “in other
contexts…any purpose including barter.”139 Indeed, Justice Scalia admits
this need in his Dissenting Opinion in Smith v. United States,140 where the
Court, in a 6-2 decision, found that the defendant’s offer of an unloaded gun
in exchange for a quantity of cocaine subjected him to the increased
penalty.141
The law also requires the use of deductive and inductive reasoning.142
A pluralistic society requires “the state act on a single, coherent set of
principles even when its citizens are divided about what the right principles
of justice and fairness really are.”143 On questions of principle versus
policy,144 the understanding of law should be normatively governed by
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 373 U.S. 682 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(delving into the legislative history of the federal Religious Freedom and Restoration Act to show
that Congress’ “purpose was ‘only to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in [Emp. Div., Dep’t
Hum. Res. Of Org .v.] Smith,’ 394 U.S. 872 (1990), not to “unsettle other areas of the law,” citing
139 Cong. Rec. 26178 (1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), along with other House and Senate
documents; see also Vincent J. Samar, Interpreting Hobby Lobby to Not Harm LGBT Civil Rights,
60 S. D. LAW REV. 457, 462-64 (2015)).
138. Dworkin, supra note 76, at 117.
139. Dworkin, supra note 76, at 117.
140. Id. at 23-24 (citing Smith v. U.S., 508 U.S. 223 (1993)).
141. Id.
142. See HOLMES, supra note 63, at 1, 244 (This author’s use of inductive as well as deductive
logic is in response to Holmes’ claim that law is not logic, but experience.).
143. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 166 (1986).
144. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977) (Dworkin had previously
defined “a policy [as] that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an
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integrity. It should hold that “propositions of law are true if they figure in or
follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process
that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal
practice.”145 The requirement that the interpretation should follow from an
acknowledgement of broader higher law principles seems most present in
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence. There, distinctions
involving mostly policies (those that are economically, socially, or
politically based) and have little effect on an individual’s status, are afforded
the lowest standard of scrutiny, rational basis review.146 This stands in stark
contrast to cases involving a more invidious form of discrimination, such as
classifications based on stereotypes about sex or gender, which requires
intermediate scrutiny to determine if the state had an important enough
interest to justify its discriminatory action.147 Cases involving race-based
classifications require strict scrutiny because the class has suffered a history
of discrimination inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection, and
unrelated to the class’ ability to perform. The class is generally powerless to
obtain assistance through normal political procedures.148
Thus, legal interpretation cannot be disconnected from moral
interpretation. Although a policy may aim to create a common good (as a
utilitarian might wish), it still must be justified on moral grounds if its effect
is to unfairly discriminate amongst those affected by it. By “moral,” I mean
those values most essential to society’s existence. It does not necessarily
refer to only popular values, although some degree of social awareness
regarding their importance is necessary. However, this poses another
problem: if morals are relevant to an interpretation, which morals are to
govern any interpretation? Values associated with particularistic moralities,
such as religious moralities, are too idiosyncratic to provide the continuity

improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the community. He also had defined
“a ‘principle’ [as] a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an
economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice
or fairness or some other dimension of morality.” Id.).
145. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE supra note 143 at 225.
146. See, e.g., Nabbia v. N.Y., 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (The Supreme Court applied rational basis
review to uphold New York’s Milk Control Board’s regulation of milk prices to protect dairy
farmers, dealers, and retailers.).
147. See, e.g., U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (The Court required an “exceedingly
persuasive” justification for Virginia’s Military Academy denial of allowing women into the
Academy designed to produce “citizen-soldiers.”).
148. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (applied strict scrutiny to prohibit the
state from taking a child away from its mother because of an interracial marriage); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (allowing under strict scrutiny the University of Michigan Law
School to take race into account to achieve the state’s compelling interest in maintaining a diverse
student body since its individualized admissions process was narrowly drawn).
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required to hold a pluralistic society together. Values identified by the
Framers provide a better starting point: liberty as with due process, equality
as with equal protection, and various other values, explicitly written into or
implicitly founded upon the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of expression
and religious liberty,149 a right to privacy,150 and protections against arbitrary
arrest or seizure of the person or his effects,151 should play a role, along with
a right to a fair and speedy trial and to be confronted by witnesses against
one,152 the right to own property,153 and the right to vote.154 These values
seem to be universal, and are particularly important for individual well-being
in a pluralistic society. The protection against arbitrary arrest is the
requirement that probable cause be present to believe a crime is being
committed.
If all that was being asserted was the presence of a right as object for
interpretation, there would be less interpretative concern. Granted, there
would be a concern if the rights were not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution and had to be inferred, but this could still be solved through
appeal, for example, to the Tenth Amendment.155 In law, however, implicit
rights are affirmed upon close examination of a factual situation where the
right, as with the line of privacy cases beginning with Griswold v.
Connecticut, represents an important value in need of constitutional
protection. Since this process will likely continue in the future, as new
situations present new reasons for the recognition of rights, emphasis on how
unenumerated rights should be identified and what meanings they should
have become ever more important, just as emphasis on how new structures
might be adopted to meet changing circumstances also become relevant.

V. Sources of Human Rights
It was suggested earlier that human rights beyond those found in the
Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, such as those found in
international human rights documents the United States has signed onto, may

149.
150.
at 113.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See the line of cases from Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. at 479, to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (slavery), XIX (sex), XXIV (age).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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156

also be good candidates for constitutional attention.
These rights are not
self-evident in the Constitution, but are the result of processes designed to
provide a set of norms across various cultures and societies. Indeed, the
antecedents of that process can be traced back “to League of Nations
institutions that dealt with minority rights and mandated territories;” later, to
the inclusion of some vague language written into the Charter of the United
Nations by “smaller countries and nongovernmental organizations . . . for the
inclusion of an international bill of rights in the Charter.”157 With some
difficulties along the way, “[i]n time, the membership of the United Nations
came to accept the proposition that the Charter had internationalized the
concept of human rights.”158 This opened the door to nation-states like the
United States being “deemed to have assumed some international obligations
relating to human rights.”159 Even more important was “the obligation
imposed by Article 56 on United Nations member states, which required
them to cooperate with the organization in the promotion of human rights [as
it] provided the United Nations with the requisite legal authority to embark
on what became a massive lawmaking effort to define and codify these
rights.”160 Those rights are now identified in various international
documents including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
(“UDHR”),161 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) (1966),162 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)(1966).163 These rights are not without
limitation, as illustrated by the use of reservations by some state signatories

156. See, e.g., Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M.
368; Int’l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360.
See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR (hereinafter
“UDHR”); see also Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 289 (1965), arguing that many of the
provisions of the UDHR have come into acceptance as international customary law.
157. Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 784-86 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
158. Buergenthal, supra note 157, at 787.
159. Id.
160. Id. citing U.N. Charter art. 56, which states: “[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55.” Article 55 states: “[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote . . . (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Id.
161. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR.
162. Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
163. Int’l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1967, 93 U.N.T.S. 3.
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to these treaties. Regardless, the fact that the covenants recite most of the
rights identified in the Declaration as legally binding gave rise to opinio juris
and widespread practice to most of the rights listed in the Declaration also
becoming part of customary international law.165 The question thus to be
considered here is: should these rights now be considered part of United
States constitutional law? Article VI of the United States Constitution
provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.166
This was applied in Reid v. Covert,167 in which the Supreme Court
considered whether a military tribunal might try, under a treaty, a civilian
dependent for the murder of her military husband in a foreign land. Noting
that this would violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, the Court
found the trial not justified.168 In the language of the Court,
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those
who created the Constitution, as well as those who were
responsible for the Bill of Rights—let alone alien to our
entire constitutional history and tradition—to construe
Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power
under an international agreement without observing
constitutional prohibitions.169

164. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/2, 8 I.L.M. 679 (Article 2(1)(d) of the Vienna states that a “’reservation’ means a
unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, or approving when acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state.”).
165. See Brian D. Lepard, Why Customary International Law Matters in Protecting Human
Rights, VÖLKERRESCHTSBOG (Feb. 25, 2019), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/why-customary-intern
ational-law-matters-in-protecting-human-rights/.
166. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
167. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion of Black, J.); see also Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (reiterating the Reid standard).
168. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 39-40.
169. Reid, 354 U.S. at 17.
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The Court noted that the reason why treaties were not required under
Article VI to be made pursuant to the Constitution “was so that agreements
made by the United States under the Articles of Confederation, including the
important peace treaties which concluded the Revolutionary War, would
remain in effect.170 More recently, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court
held that federal courts are not obligated to take account of UDHR or ICCPR
when neither the resolutions of ratification nor the treaties themselves
contain language that they are self-executing.171 Therefore, the Court is
hesitant to acknowledge enforceable rights in federal or state courts that arise
under international agreements, unless those rights comport with important
American values set forth in the Constitution or Bill of Rights.
Regardless, it is interesting to query, perhaps more so in Sosa than Reid,
whether the Court could have legitimately required federal courts to take
account of provisions of the UDHR and ICCPR as being more aligned with
the Bill of Rights, as representative of the most important human rights
values of the Constitution. Absent this solution with the above limitations
in place, the question of whether such rights exist, at least as an obligation
of the United States, can no longer be disputed.172 The use of international
human rights principles in American constitutional law has been discussed
elsewhere, so this Article will focus solely on how such human rights might
operate within American constitutional interpretation.173
But herein also lies a problem. If international human rights principles,
regardless of their origin and overarching generality in comparison to
Articles I and II, are subordinate to those structural limitations, what
authority can they assert over interpretations of these various powers of

170. Id. at 16-17.
171. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004) (footnote omitted) (holding
“the Declaration does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.”)
See The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 (quoting
Eleanor Roosevelt calling the Declaration “’a statement of principles … setting up a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’” and “’not a treaty or international
agreement … impos[ing] legal obligations’”). And, although the Covenant does bind the United
States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express
understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in
the federal courts.”).
172. In Sosa, the Court acknowledged the possible relevance of the law of nations when it
stated: “we think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on
a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.” Id. at 725.
173. See Vincent J. Samar, Justifying the Use of International Human Rights Principles in
American Constitutional Law, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing “that international
and comparative law sources are relevant to interpreting the U.S. Constitution because the
Constitution itself warrants respect only insofar as it is a means for achieving minimal protections
for human dignity”).
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government?
If no authority can be asserted, since such principles
correlate with moral claims, does this mean that morality itself (or at least
the range of moral obligations beyond what had originally given rise to the
Constitution) has no place in constitutional interpretation? Would not such
a principle in effect undercut a great deal of legitimacy often internationally
assigned to American constitutional principles, thus reducing its impact on
the global human rights stage?175 On the other hand, if there is a basis for
constitutional interpretation to make use of international human rights
principles, what is that basis and how far does it extend? The following
sections will unpack these questions.
Interestingly, the Court has already acknowledged that international
human rights has a role to play even with regard to domestic issues. In
Lawrence v. Texas,176 for example, the Court overruled its previous holding
in Bowers v. Hardwick,177 and took note of the Dudgeon decision in the
European Court of Human Rights. Five years before Bowers was decided,
Dudgeon held laws proscribing homosexual conduct in private among
consenting adults “invalid under the European Convention on Human
Rights.”178 In effect, the Court suggested that foreign interpretations of
conventions of human rights that would be similar to those the Supreme
Court might adopt under the Constitution and Bill of Rights, cannot be
ignored, even if they are not directly precedential.179 This opens the door to
an ordering principle for when international human rights principles might
operate in American constitutional interpretation. If the application of
international human rights would provide a similar interpretation to what
might be provided by a fundamental principle recognized in the United
States, even though it should add something more, its relevance is at the
apex, compared to a foreign interpretation at the nadir that seems distant

174. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (setting forth the powers specifically assigned to Congress)
and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (setting forth the powers specifically assigned to the President).
175. See Karla Jones, Our Constitutional Principles: America’s Greatest Export, ALEC (Oct.
18, 2016), https://www.alec.org/article/our-constitutional-principles-americas-greatest-export/.
176. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
177. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
178. 539 U.S. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. U.K., 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981)).
179. In Lawrence the Court noted in overruling its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (which had allowed states to continue to criminalize homosexual conduct) that
“[o]f even more importance [than The Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee of Homosexual
Offenses and Prosecution (1963), which led the British Parliament to repeal many of the offenses
involving homosexual conduct in its later Sexual Offenses Act 1967, §1, was a decision by the
European Court of Human Rights, decided five years before Bowers], holding “that the laws
proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention of Human Rights.” 539 U.S.
at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1981 & ¶ 52).
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from the way constitutional values are generally understood.
This
perspective on human rights may lessen the belief that the outside
interpretation fails to satisfy constitutional limitations, and may provide
more support for it being a consistent development of the changing American
constitutional landscape. Indeed, if this analysis had been followed in the
Sosa case, the Court might have had a different opinion for whether
international human rights agreements signed onto by the United States
would apply in federal courts, since the issue there seemed to be more about
who decides rather than what is decided. The Constitution has not
maintained its legitimacy over the years simply by producing a certain kind
of representative government; rather, its legitimacy is likely based in its
ability to operate from values that would maintain its cross-generational
vitality and legitimacy.
One does not need to be a living constitutionalist to draw out the
importance of human rights in ongoing American constitutional thought.
Even if one were an Originalist, there is reason to believe that the Framers
expected that the institutional structures they created, at times, be in service
of reconsideration of existing values, and allow for new values, so long as
they were supported by a majority of Americans. Had this not been their
intent, they could have written Article VI’s “Pursuance” clause to apply to
only treaties made after adoption of the Constitution, all others made
previously being left enforce having been adopted under the Articles of
Confederation.
It follows from what has been said that the language of the Constitution,
as the supreme law of the land, must therefore be interpreted, and it is the
responsibility of the Court to carry out that interpretation. Article III states:
“[t]he judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time

.180 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J.
concurring), where Justice Jackson affirms an analogous expression for Presidential power.
Jackson writes:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his
authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate . . . .
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he
can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain . . . .
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
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ordain and establish.”
posed the question:

123

In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall

Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to
say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked
into? That a case arising under the constitution should be
decided without examining the instrument under which it
arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained.182
So, by the Constitution’s sole grant of the judicial power to the federal
courts, it necessarily leaves to them the primary responsibility of how to
interpret the Constitution, which would include those human rights
“[t]reaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States . . . .”183

VI. Interpretation and Indeterminacy
This Article has hopefully demonstrated the continued authority of the
Constitution because the values associated with it, both past and present,
reflect society’s continuing concern to protect basic human rights in new
contexts. Joseph Raz argues that the interpretation of these values cannot
simply be reduced to reasoning from any single moral value.184 In this
regard, he noted four considerations that affect the moral merit of the
Constitution’s institutional role:
First, there is no real theory of constitutional interpretation,
in the sense of a set of principles that when applied to an
interpretative question yield the correct interpretation of the
constitutional provision concerned . . . . Second, there is a
cogent way of distinguishing between innovative and
conserving interpretations, and often between more or less
innovative (less or more conserving) interpretations. Third,
interpretation is central to legal reasoning because in legal
reasoning fidelity to an original competes with, and has to
be combined with, reasons for innovation . . . . Fourth, it
makes no sense to ask in general what is the right mix of

181.
182.
183.
184.

U.S. CONST. art. III.
5 U.S. 1 at 179.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
RAZ, supra note 118, at 355.
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These different concerns, especially the third consideration regarding the
role of the courts, reaches the foreground in the debates between Originalists
and those who follow a living Constitution approach. Although the problem
might be resolved by a suitable justificatory theory of human rights (to be
discussed in the next section), that itself assumes that the problem of moral
interpretation is not indeterminate, a position Raz would question. It also
presupposes that different considerations might support alternative,
incommensurable views. If the moral principles relied upon are themselves
indeterminate, are the courts truly best equipped to resolve the interpretative
problem? Part of the issue here seems to be the unstated need to find an
answer that can withstand the challenge of moral relativism.186
This problem finds expression in the area of international human
rights debates, as Alan Buchanan, for example, has noted:
It is often said that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the various human rights treaties that followed it wisely
avoided attempting a justification for the norms they asserted. To
paraphrase the philosopher Jacques Maritain, it was possible to
agree on a list of human rights only on the condition that almost
nothing was said about how they are grounded.187
Buchanan does, however, offer the hopeful possibility that:
In the end, whether a justification becomes available will depend
not only upon the further development of the moral foundations
of the idea of human rights—a task which until recently most
contemporary moral and political philosophers, like most
international legal theorists, have avoided—but also upon
improvements in the global public deliberative processes that
occur within the complex array of institutions within which
human rights norms are articulated, contested, and revised over
time.188
185. RAZ, supra note 118, at 361.
186. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS 28 (1906) (Sociologist William Graham
Sumner wrote in 1906, that “[t]he ‘right’ way is the way which the ancestors used and which has
been handed down. The tradition is its own warrant.”).
187. ALLEN BUCHANAN, The Legitimacy of International Law in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
188. Id. (footnote omitted).
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In the context of constitutional law, because values are always present, it
helps to identify the three distinct levels of interpretation where human rights
values are likely to be implicated.
The first and most basic level are constitutional norms. This level
includes basic principles of human rights that are synonymous with the
fundamental rights already recognized by the Supreme Court,189 but must be
able to assimilate other human rights, yet to be recognized, as part of what
the Constitution affirms. Recall that a married couple’s right to use
contraceptives,190 and a single person’s right to the same,191 along with a
woman’s right to bear or beget a child,192 and a same-sex couple’s right to
marry,193 were all unknown until the Court recognized a constitutional right
to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
even then, only over time, was the right to privacy extended to afford
protection in all three areas.194 Part of the explanation for the time lag is that
the Court does not offer advisory opinions, but instead waits for an actual
case or controversy to arise before it affords a resolution.195 In Griswold, the
time lag also provided the Justices an opportunity to decide where this right
to privacy might be located in the Constitution, since it is not explicitly
mentioned in the document.196 Of course, at this first level of interpretation,
189. See BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 20 (This level corresponds to what Bobbitt has identified
as the Supreme Court’s sometimes use of an ethical modality.).
190. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding for the first time the existence of a
marital right to privacy to use contraceptives and physicians to advise on their use). For a broader
discussion on how the constitutional right to privacy relates to the Fourth Amendment and tort
protections of privacy, as well as how privacy might be grounded in autonomy, see generally
VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 51-117
(1991).
191. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
192. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 (where the Court settles on the Fourteenth Amendment as
the basis for the right to privacy); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
193. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584. Interestingly, in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy’s
Majority Opinion holding the right of same-sex marriage to be part of the fundamental right of
marriage, indicates that his due process analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment was informed
by the Equal Protection Clause, although he does not say exactly how. Id. at 2602-03. For a
discussion of how these two clauses might be aligned, see Vincent J. Samar, At the Intersection of
Due Process and Equal Protection: Expanding the Range of Protected Interests, 68 CATH. U. L.
REV. 87 (2019).
194. See Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (The Court has interpreted U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1 to require a real case or controversy, before a decision can be rendered.).
195. See Controversy, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/controversy (last
visited July 15, 2019).
196. The Justices forming the majority in Griswold disagreed as to whether the right was in
the penumbra of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, 381 U.S. at 484 (Douglas,
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decisions may appear somewhat open-ended, though they are not necessarily
unprincipled. As will be shown below, a framework guides interpretations
at this level and is not confined to either Originalism or open to the possible
indeterminacy that might be characteristic of a common law-like, living
Constitution approach.
The second level for interpretation concerns structural matters. The
Constitution provides very specific institutional structures for the
architecture of the federal government, and identifies specific powers each
branch of that structure—legislative, executive, and judicial—is entitled to
exercise.197 All other matters are left to be resolved by either Congress or
the state legislatures.198 Since this level represents the thoughts of the
Framers to specifically guarantee the protection of liberty, and later, after
passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, both liberty and equality, it
bears a presumption of legitimacy under constitutional norms.199 That is to
say, if the original institutional structures set out by the Framers were thought
necessary to secure liberty and later to secure both liberty and equality, then
insofar as these norms remain salient, the structures that support them should
remain intact. Consequently, at this level, major changes of structure would
most likely occur only if there was a significant change in the norms
supported, and even then, they would likely continue by shifting their
support to a new set of replacement norms, unless impracticable.
Consequently, a total demise of these structures would require a
constitutional amendment following the procedures in Article V.
Here, it is certainly reasonable to suppose that, at the boundaries where
structures fail to adequately guarantee constitutional norms, adjustments
may be needed regarding the way the Constitution is written. For example,
the Twelfth Amendment continues the earlier Article II requirement for the
election of the President and Vice President by a vote of the Electoral
College.200 It added the requirement that the Electors designate who they
were voting for President from whom they were selecting as Vice President.
This was to prevent a future election from occurring, like the 1800 election
between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr that was forced into the United
States House of Representatives because both candidates received the same
J. plurality); or in the Ninth Amendment reservation of rights “retained by the people,” Id. at 499
(Goldberg, J. concurring); or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Id. at 500 (Harlan, J. concurring).
197. See generally U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III.
198. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
199. See BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 13, 4 (Bobbitt’s historical and textual modalities fit within
this second level of interpretation provided the institutions are able to function adequately to
guarantee the protection of constitutional norms.).
200. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XII (1804) with id. art. II, §1, cl. 3 (1789).
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number of electoral votes, notwithstanding that the electors themselves had
intended Jefferson to be President and Burr to be Vice President.201
The third level for constitutional interpretation concerns innovations to
meet changing social conditions. Thomas Jefferson had suggested the need
to adapt the Constitution to meet changing circumstances, without referring
to the amendment process.202 In an important letter to Samuel Kercheval, in
1816, seven years after serving as President, Jefferson wrote:
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes
in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had
better be borne with; because when once known, we
accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of
correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human
mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as
new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners
and opinions change, with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.
We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which
fitted him when he a boy, as civilized society to remain ever
under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.203
The progress anticipated by Jefferson arrived a century later with the
advent of the Great Depression and the rise of the regulatory state in which
Congress delegated some of its legislative authority to specific agencies to
make rules to protect individuals’ economic and social well-being.204 Three
examples are presented for illustration. In 1913, Congress created the
Federal Reserve System to make monetary policy and to supervise banking
by transferring some of its constitutional authority, “[t]o coin Money [and]
regulate the Value thereof,” to a Board that would oversee private baking in

201. See Amendment XII in The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/constitution-annotated/ (last visited June 14,
2019).
202. Letter to Samuel Kercheval, Monticello, July 12, 1816, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 90, at 674.
203. Id.
204. 5.1 Administrative Agencies: Their Structures and Powers in INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF PROPERTY, ESTATE PLANNING AND INSURANCE, https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_intro
duction-to-the-law-of-property-estate-planning-and-insurance/s08-01-administrative-agencies-the
ir-.html (last visited June 14, 2019).
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the United States. In 1933, Congress adopted the Agricultural Adjustment
Act “to stabilize production in agriculture by offering subsidies to farmers to
limit their crops.”206 Although the Act would eventually be held
unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment, the Court in that
case adopted a view previously set forth by Alexander Hamilton “that
Congress could tax and spend for any purpose that it believed served the
general welfare, so long as Congress did not violate another constitutional
provision.”207 The following year, the Court upheld Congress’ creation of
the Social Security Act under its broad taxing and spending authority.208
Were these violations of Article I’s statement, “[A]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives[?]”209 A key question
surrounding the Tenth Amendment is whether it provides “a judicially
enforceable limit on Congress’s powers.”210 The Court has at times
vacillated, sometimes finding that “the Tenth Amendment is not a separate
constraint on Congress, but rather, is simply a reminder that Congress only
may legislate if it has authority under the Constitution.”211 At other times,
the Court has found “that the Tenth Amendment protects state sovereignty
from federal intrusion.”212 Surely, at the time it was adopted ,changes in the
economies of other countries did not so clearly and often implicate changes
in the United States economy.213 Given the uncertainty of the future, is it
reasonable to suppose that the Framers meant to create a Constitution and
Bill of Rights that would be frozen by its structures to only being able to
meet then current social and economic conditions?214 Surely, Jefferson, who

205. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 5; see Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. 63-43, ch. 6, 38
Stat. 251 (1913), amend. 1933 Banking Act, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162.
206. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 274 (3d ed.
2006) (citing U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
207. CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note 206, at
274 (citing Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66 (1935)).
208. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Note: Bobbitt’s structural and
prudential modalities can be seen to play an important role here. See BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 14,
15, 16.
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
210. CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note 206, at
312.
211. Id. at 313.
212. Id.
213. See M. Ayhan Kose, Csilla Lakatos, Franziska Ohnsorge, & Marc Stocker,
Understanding the Global Role of the U.S. Economy, VOX CEPR POLICY PORTAL (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://voxeu.org/article/understanding-global-role-us-economy.
214. In Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825), Chief Justice Marshall distinguished
“important subjects,” which must be entirely regulated by Congress from “mere details,” the latter
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perceived himself to be a constitutional strict constructionist, did not think
so, as he himself went ahead with the Louisiana Purchase when that
unexpected opportunity came his way during his presidency.215
Granted, there is always the Article V amendment route. However, that
approach is very time-consuming and may elicit concerns outside of the
immediate subject matter.216 If the Constitution created a government that
would endure, then one duty for the Supreme Court would be to check on
whether a change in interpretation of some provision of the Constitution was
necessary to the overall well-being of the United States as prescribed in the
Preamble, and was not specifically violative of any other provision.
Moreover, if anyone might worry that allowing such changes might be too
dangerous to liberty, consider Professor Ackerman’s point, that the third
republic of the United States—the one that began with Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s New Deal—was approved by a significant number of Americans
who elected and re-elected this Democratic president, and also provided him
in his first re-election a decisive Democratic majority in Congress that would
eventually lead to “the recognition by all three branches that the People had
spoken.”217

VII. Affirming Human Rights
Up to this point, the priority for constitutional interpretation has been to
promote constitutional norms, especially those affording fundamental
human rights, while also allowing for the possibility that the set of norms
might be expanded or adjusted as to their relevant scope or contents to meet
changing circumstances, so long as they do not become too distant from
existing norms. Secondarily, constitutional interpretation was to keep in
place the basic institutional structures created by the Framers, provided these

of which Congress could delegate. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989), the
Supreme Court applied an “intelligible principle” test that required Congress to clearly delineate
the public policy it was applying and the boundaries of the delegated authority.” In Chevron v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984), the Court held that since Congress did not
express a clear intention when it used the phrase “statutory source” in the Clean Air Act, the
agency’s construction of the term “source” was a reasonable policy choice that must be given
deference. See also Ganesh Sitaraman, Our Constitution Wasn’t Built for This, N.Y. TIMES
OPINION (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/16/opinion/sunday/constitutioneconomy.html.
215. See Adam Kloppe, The Louisiana Purchase and the Constitutionalism of Thomas
Jefferson, MISSOURI HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Mar. 17, 2015), https://mohistory.org/blog/thelouisiana-purchase-and-the-constitutionalism-of-thomas-jefferson/.
216. See The Amendment Process: Adding a New Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Not An Easy Task, HARRY S. TRUMAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM,
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/teacher_lessons/3branches/15b.htm.
217. See ACKERMAN, supra note 95, at 110-11.
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structures should continue to serve constitutional norms generally, and to
make further adjustments by way of the Article V amendment process.
Lastly, constitutional interpretation was to allow for innovation in the
creation of new governmental agencies to meet changing conditions that
could not have been foreseen by the Framers, but which Congress could
institute if approved by the federal courts.
Thus, the important matter of indeterminacy, raised in the previous
section, must now be discussed to ensure that additions and adjustments to
underlying constitutional norms or innovations to the structures not just be
“code” for simply bending to the will of the current legislative majority. The
concern in both these instances is to protect important constitutional norms,
since the structures exist in order to support and guarantee these norms.218
Consequently, at the constitutional level, what matters is finding some
criteria to determine which additional norms or changes to norms are
legitimate, and how to determine what weight they should be afforded. The
importance of this question must not be understated, since implicit in the
answer will be the way the whole constitutional framework operates. Values
are the key, and so determining which values and what weight to afford them
is all important. This is also at the core of the debate between Originalists
and those who subscribe to a living Constitution. It was also implicit in
Buchanan’s concern that the nations that agreed to recognize a set of
international human rights only did so because there was no justification for
their foundation. That problem now needs to be solved specifically
regarding how American constitutional interpretation may move forward.219
The approach to be adopted here to resolve the problem of
indeterminacy relies on the work of the American moral philosopher, Alan
Gewirth. In Reason and Morality,220 Gewirth lays a foundation for a
consistent set of human rights that do not beg any question and can operate
together.221 He does this by searching for a moral principle that might
underlie such rights. He begins by taking note of the various failed attempts
throughout history to provide a non-question begging, adequate justification

218. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (In Federalist 39, James Madison makes clear
the norms that would govern the republican government established by the Convention.).
219. Elsewhere, this issue is discussed in the context of grounding a set of international human
rights. See Samar, supra note 173, at 40-63.
220. ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978).
221. Id. at 21.
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222

for a human rights principle, including intuitionism, institutionalism,223
interests,224 intrinsic worth of human beings,225 and John Rawls’ approach of
searching for such rights behind a veil of ignorance where representative
persons do not know any particular facts about themselves, but only know
general facts concerning human motivation, as might be found from the
study of psychology or economics.226 Since all of these approaches fail to
provide a determinate justification for moral rights, Gewirth instead uses as
his starting point what lies behind any moral rights claim that an agent might
make. Note that at this point Gewirth focuses on individual claims, not
institutional claims, although what he ultimately arrives at can be applied to
institutions in the same way as it is applied to individuals, especially the
institution of law. Gewirth remarks that:
Amid the immense variety of [practical] precepts [that set
requirements for human action], they have in common that the
intention of the persons who set them forth is to guide, advise, or
urge the persons to whom they are directed so that these latter

222. Id. at 14. Gewirth’s response to arguments based on intuition points out that “[a]ccording
to the Declaration of Independence, the unalienable rights of man include life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness; yet Jefferson accepted the legitimacy of capital punishment, imprisonment,
and military conscription. If no qualifications are introduced, two complementary things must be
said about the relation between the ideal rights and the actual laws: not only is the relation between
these not one of deduction, but they appear to conflict with one another unless modifying
considerations are provided.” Id. at 280.
223. Id. at 27 (pointing out that “[t]he primary morality, in this view, is that of ‘my station and
its duties’ as derived from the requirements of groups, so that a person is an ‘assemblage of roles:’
husband, father, voter, taxpayer, carpenter, union member, proletarian, buyer, bowling-team
captain, or more generally a member of some national, religious, ethnic, or racial group or economic
class, and so forth.”)
224. Gewirth notes “[i]t is sometimes argued that because all persons equally have certain
needs or desires, it follows that all persons ought equally to have the means of satisfying these
needs or desires. Entirely apart from the gap here between ‘is’ and ‘ought, there is the further
difficulty that . . . [inegalitarian ideals] . . . should all be given equal weight.” Id. at 18-19.
225. Here, Gewirth notes that “[i]n the classic formulation of Thomas Aquinas’s natural law
theory, there are only two morally right modes of derivation: human laws must be derivable from
natural law either by deduction or specification. In the first way human law’s prohibition of murder
is derived from natural law’s prohibition of inflicting evil on other persons; in the second way
human law’s specification of the death penalty for evildoing is derived from natural law’s
prescription that evildoers be punished. The trouble with this simple way of relating natural law to
human law is that it does not serve to explain the seeming conflicts between the two kinds of law”
as, e.g., if the punishment is death. Id. (footnote omitted).
226. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220 (stating that “the veil of ignorance,
in addition to its obvious non-rational (because noncognitive) features, is, like the assumption of
original equality, a way of removing from [representative persons] the rational choosers’
consideration certain factors, consisting in their actual empirical inequalities and dissimilarities,
that together with their self-interest would strongly influence them to make inegalitarian choices”).
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persons will more or less reflectively fashion their behavior along
the lines indicated in the precepts. Hence, it is assumed that the
hearers can control their behavior through their unforced choice
as to try to achieve the prescribed ends or contents, although they
may also intentionally refrain from complying with the precepts.
From this it follows that action, in the strict sense that is relevant
to moral and other practical precepts, has two interrelated generic
features: voluntariness or freedom and purposiveness or
intentionality.227
Together, these two generic features of action that underlie all moral
and practical precepts (including constitutional precepts) provide for
Gewirth an independent ground for a moral principle from which human
rights can be derived. Since the analysis for his grounding of human rights
is not restricted to any particular institutional arrangement nor limited by any
particular religious or cultural precondition, its use, especially when
combined with American historical considerations,228 should be of great help

227. Id. at 26-27. Contra Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations in PHILOSOPHY OF INT’L
LAW, 324 (Joseph Raz misconstrues Gewirth’s justification for human rights when he claims first,
that “[Gewirth] ignores the possibility of believing that certain conditions are essential to our life,
and even of striving to secure such conditions, without either claiming or having a right to them”
and second, by stating that Gewirth believes “that there is a general (overridable) right to freedom
because ‘freedom is a necessary condition of purposive action’—a claim which is evidently false
if it means that, for instance, slaves cannot act purposively.” Id. Raz’s first criticism misconstrues
Gewirth’s claim that all human actions, insofar as they are purposive, presuppose some pro-attitude
or value under which they are undertaken. To deny this would be to contradict oneself. Regarding
Raz’s second criticism, Gewirth’s states that “freedom and well-being (with their bases in
voluntariness and purposiveness, respectively), can be distinguished from one another as entering
into the general context of action…. Freedom involves a procedural aspect of actions in that it
concerns the way actions are controlled as ongoing events. Well-being, on the other hand, while
also having a procedural aspect, involves the substantive aspect of actions, the specific contents of
these events.” ALAN GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT 112 (1998). Certainly, no one would consider
the slave who acts on behest of his master to be acting truly voluntarily.).
228. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Anti-Federalists, who are credited with getting the Bill of
Rights adopted, contradictorily “favored both government encouragement of religion and liberty of
individual conscience.” HERBERT STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 64 (1981). In 1779, Thomas
Jefferson drafted what would eventually become The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom (1786), which clearly spoke to freedom of conscience and delineated a separation of
church and state. See Thomas Jefferson and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, VIRGINIA
MUSEUM FOR HISTORY AND CULTURE, https://www.virginiahistory.org/collections-andresources/virginia-history-explorer/thomas-jefferson (last visited June 25, 2019). Later he would
write to the Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, on Jan. 1, 180: “I contemplate . . .
building a wall of separation between Church and State.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bap
tists_in_the_history_of_separation_of_church_and_state (last visited June 25, 2019). U.S. CONST.
art. VI, § 3 provides: “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States.”
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in delineating which rights best fit the American constitutional framework.
Indeed, as it turns out, because the theory also affords criteria for the
resolution of conflicts of rights, it should also be of help in resolving the
problem of indeterminacy.
This is how the derivation proceeds. When an agent (i.e., an actor)
practically performs an action, her thinking can be expressed linguistically
as “I choose to do X for purpose E,” or more simply, “I do X for purpose
E.”229 If the agent is rational, then from her standpoint, dialectically, “E is
good” is a claim that can be associated to her qua agent.230 This is true even
where the action is arbitrarily chosen and has no moral, legal, or prudential
worth.231 From this it follows, the agent values her voluntariness or freedom
without which she could not act,232 and her purposiveness or well-being
without which she could not achieve the goal for which she acts.233 Wellbeing can be separated into three levels. Basic well-being is the precondition
without which one could not act such as life, physical integrity and mental
equilibrium.234 Non-subtractive well-being includes the condition for
maintaining one’s current level of purpose fulfillment, which is undermined
when one is lied to, defrauded or a promise is broken.235 Additive well-being
is the condition required for increasing one’s level of purpose fulfillment;236
these include adequate health care, a minimal living wage, and education.237
Thus, because freedom and well-being are necessary to an agent doing X for
purpose E, from the agent’s point of view, she logically claims rights to these
generic goods by her very actions.238 Indeed, if she were to deny “I have
rights to freedom and well-being,” the agent would also have to deny “all
other persons ought at least to refrain from interfering with my freedom and
well-being” because rights, in the relevant sense here, are correlative with
duties.239 This would lead to a contradiction if she also accepts “My freedom
and well-being are necessary goods,” which the agent must accept; “for by
virtue of regarding [her] purposes as good the agent must also a fortiori value
[her] freedom and well-being, as required for achieving any of [her]

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 42, 49 (1978).
GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 44, 49.
Id. at 51, 75-76.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 53-54.
See id. at 54.
See id. at 54-56, 233.
GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 56.
See id. at 240, 243-44.
See id. at 63-64.
Id. at 80.
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purposes.”
However, “the objects to which the agent necessarily claims
rights are only those goods that are truly necessary for [her] action or [her]
successful action in general;” it would not include, for example, “I must have
a motorcycle.”241
Up to this point, Gewirth has succeeded only in establishing that any
agent qua agent must logically claim, from her own internal conative
standpoint, rights to the generic and necessary conditions of her action. This
prudential standard is different from a moral standard. “Morality . . . is
primarily concerned with interpersonal actions, that is, with actions that
affect persons other than their agents.”242 Thus, to advance the agent’s claim
to a moral level, Gewirth must further establish a moral principle in which
all other prospective purposive agents “logically must acknowledge certain
generic obligations. Negatively, [s]he ought to refrain from coercing and
from harming [her] recipients; positively, [s]he ought to assist them to have
freedom and well-being whenever they cannot otherwise have these
necessary goods and [s]he can help them at no comparable cost to
[her]self[.]”243 That principle, which Gewirth calls the Principle of Generic
Consistency (“PGC”) is a “categorical” moral principle.244 It states: “[a]ct
in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as yourself.245
The way he reaches this moral standard is as follows.
The agent’s prudential claim gives rise to a moral claim because “‘I
have rights to freedom and well-being’ entails ‘All other persons ought to
respect my freedom and well-being.’”246 And since any agent can make this
same claim for the sufficient justifying reason of just being an agent, it can
be universalized to “[a]ll prospective purposive agents have rights to
freedom and well-being.”247 Thus, although the PGC was derived
dialectically and cannot be separated from its dialectical linkage, Gewirth is
able to assert, that the principle, now standing by itself, requires that “every
agent logically must accept that [s]he ought to act in accord with the generic
rights of [her] recipients as well as [her]self.”248 The latter follows from the
fact that “[t]he PGC is a product not of ignorance, but rather of rational
awareness of what logically follows from being an agent, so that its
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id. at 82 (italics added).
GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 129.
Id.at 135.
Id.
Id.at 135.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 155.
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obligatoriness is not overcome, but rather is established and reinforced by
rational understanding of its basis.”249
Additionally, the PGC affirms positive as well as negative rights. “The
negative rights require that limitations not be imposed by social conventions
or political power on persons’ ability to aspire realistically to whatever goals
their inherent capacities may render feasible . . . .”250 “The positive rights
require social arrangements whereby persons are helped to develop their
abilities of aspiration-fulfillment so long as they cannot do so by their own
efforts.”251 For purposes of this article, acknowledging the logical grounding
of the PGC as a non-question begging standard for morality identifies what
human rights exist, along with how conflicts among these rights are
rationally resolved. The distinction between identifying which rights are
human rights and showing how conflicts among these rights are resolved can
now be set forth.
Because the PGC derives from the conviction that any agent would
logically have to acknowledge on pain of contradiction that she has rights to
freedom and well-being,252 and because all human beings capable of
voluntary purposive action are, at least, prospective agents,253 it follows that
the PGC can provide a baseline for determining human rights whether or not
present in the Constitution or in international documents generally.254 The
baseline calls attention to the fact that the rights exist by virtue of their being
necessary for prospective purposive agency, regardless of whether there is a
need for their actualization at the moment or even whether the need can be
fulfilled.255 This is particularly important in relation to social arrangements.
Remember, it is not a specific claim to freedom or well-being, as the earlier
motorcycle example represents, that the PGC protects, but what an agent qua
agent would necessarily have to claim merely by being an agent. Here, is
where more specific human rights may get instantiated as necessary for the
continuation of human beings as prospective purposive agents. It is here also
that the rights to freedom and well-being may apply to guide answers to
situations where purposive agency in general would otherwise be

249. Id. at 156.
250. GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 227, at 94.
251. Id.
252. See GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 103.
253. See id. at 141. Elsewhere, I discuss the situation of infants, very young children, and the
fetus. See generally Vincent J. Samar, Personhood Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 MARQ.
L. REV. 287 (2017).
254. See GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 64 (noting that the generic
rights “are ‘human rights’ in that they are rights that all humans have as human agents”).
255. Id. at 317.

(DO NOT DELETE)

136

10/29/2019 10:47 AM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
256

[Vol. 47:1
257

threatened.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights generally,
along with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,258 and the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights259 (discussed above260) in
particular, provide good examples of where states should be expected to
assure the protection of these rights. The former is aimed at providing
individual freedom and protection from coercive practices by governments
that do not try to protect human rights. The latter is aimed at supporting
well-being to the extent the governments in question have the resources
necessary to render that support. The Kantian requirement that Ought
implies Can governs the application of the latter covenant.261 The same
could be said for other covenants the various members of the United Nations
adopt to support human rights.262 It also fits our earlier discussion of values
that motivated the Framers’ adoption of the Bill of Rights, especially the
value of guaranteeing freedom from the possibility of an oppressive and
coercive government. A similar argument could be made for the value of
equality that motivated the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
especially in the context of assuring former slaves’ privileges and

256. An argument for the derivation of specific human rights from a more general moral
standard and from there an even more specific set of gay rights can be found at Vincent J. Samar,
Gay Rights as a Particular Instantiation of Human Rights, 64 ALBANY L. REV. 983 (2001).
257. 217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
258. Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M.
368.
259. Int’l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1967, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
260. Section 5, supra.
261. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 473(Norman Kemp Smith trans.,
MacMillon and Co., Ltd., 2d ed. 1929) (1781).
262. See, e.g., Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 U.N.T.S. 253, as amended by Protocol
Amending Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 182 U.N.T.S. 51; Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention on Decent Work
for Domestic Workers, June 16, 2011, ILO No. 189; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 6 I.L.M. 78; Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 350 (CERD); G.A.
Res. 3068 (XXVIII), Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
(Nov. 30, 1973); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; G.A.
Res. 54/263, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 (May 25, 2000); Protocol on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. A/Res/54/263 (2000); Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
(CEDAW); G.A. Res. 46 (XXXIX) 1984) annex, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and
Inhuman Degrading Treatment of Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (Dec. 10, 1984),
as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (Oct. 23, 1985); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, (U.S. signed but not ratified); and International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006, 2715 U.N.T.S.
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immunities as citizens of the United States and states where they lived.263
Here, one sees that the value of equality not only guarantees equal freedom
but also, when considered in context of opportunities, affords the same legal
opportunities other citizens possess.264 Obviously, historical examples that
would illustrate this development took many decades,265 and the extension
of these rights to other groups did not happen quickly, which included
women,266 illegitimate children,267 and gays and lesbians.268 Thus, this
historical development is consistent with what the PGC requires as a
grounding principle to protect freedom and well-being of all persons.
Having thus shown the PGC can identify specific human rights, the
question that must now be considered is, what purpose might it serve in cases
of conflicts of rights? It may be helpful to note how the different levels of
well-being discussed above allow for two ways to resolve conflicts of rights
among individuals. Where the conflict is at the same level, as when an
aggressor uses his freedom to attack a basic right to well-being of his
recipient, the PGC recognizes a transactional inconsistency created by the
aggressor’s implicit claim that his rights are more valuable than his
recipient’s.269 In that instance, the recipient, whose rights are the same as
the aggressor because both are prospective purposive agents, can

263. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. at 429, the Court struck down a state court’s order denying
a mother custody of her child because she married a man of a different race. In that case, Chief
Justice Burger wrote: “[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all
governmentally imposed discrimination based on race,” effectively knocking out any use of race to
gain a privilege under the law. Id. at 432.
264. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. at 432.
265. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 537, the Court upheld a Louisiana law that mandated
“separate but equal facilities” on railroad cars for blacks and whites, a judgement that would later
be implicitly overruled in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. at 483, when the Court held
segregation in the public schools to be unconstitutional. Importantly, in that decision Chief Justice
Warren’s opinion began by explaining that the constitutionality of the issue of segregation could
not be resolved based on the Framers’ intent because the historical sources “[a]t best…are
inconclusive” and did not fit the way education of whites in the South had changed from originally
being in the hands of private groups. Id. at 489-90. The Court then took note of the recent fact that
“'[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children” especially “when it has the sanction of the law.” Id. at 494.
266. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (where the Supreme Court applied intermediate
scrutiny for gender classifications); see also U.S. v. Va. Military Acad., 518 U.S. at 515.
267. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a state statute
that required only the consent of the mother and not the father to place for adoption a child born
out-of-wedlock).
268. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 558 (upholding a due process liberty right for samesex intimate associations); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2071 (holding that the
fundamental right to marry includes the right to a same-sex marriage).
269. See GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 213.

(DO NOT DELETE)

138

10/29/2019 10:47 AM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 47:1

legitimately protect herself, even by the use of deadly force if warranted.270
In short, self-defense is morally justified.271 On the positive side, because
“the agent necessarily holds that [s]he has a right to the basic goods that are
necessary preconditions of action, so [s]he must hold that other persons also
have this basic right.”272 This gives rise to a positive duty to help where, for
example, one might be drowning, and the potential rescuer could save the
person at no comparable costs to herself.273 Both examples illustrate “the
entitlements to the goods of the parties affected, as ascertained by the
consideration of equal rights to the necessary conditions of agency.”274 But
what about cases where the conflict may not involve basic or even the same
level of well-being but loss, for example, of some non-subtractive well-being
in order to preserve basic well-being?275 In that instance, the degree of
needfulness of action must be taken into account.276 As with the duty to
rescue, where the harm is especially great to purpose fulfillment, the duty to
prevent the harm takes on greater significance.277 An obvious historical
example would be lying to the Gestapo about where the Jewish family might
be hiding to prevent their being murdered. Although the lie lowers the level
of the Gestapo’s non-subtractive well-being to fulfill their purposes, because
their purposes are to destroy basic rights of innocent people, one is morally
permitted to lie and, if one can do so at no comparable harm to oneself, the
lie is obligatory.278
But the story does not end here. The larger issue, and the issue for this
Article, is how these criteria might operate to provide grounds for
interpretation of the United States Constitution and laws, both of which will
likely implicate human rights. In this regard, it is worth noting that the PGC
applies to institutions indirectly.279 This is especially important to note, since
“social rules [that ‘involve complex interactions among many persons’] may
require that agents [sometimes] violate the PGC’s direct applications.”280
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 217.
273. See GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 217-19.
274. Id. at 216.
275. Id. at 236.
276. Gewirth had earlier noted: “The loss of dispositional or long-range freedom, such as by
imprisonment or enslavement, makes all or most purposive action impossible, while to lose some
occurrent or particular freedom debars one from some particular action but not from all actions.”
Id. at 52.
277. See id. at 236-37.
278. See id. at 237; see also G EWIRTH , S ELF -F ULFILLMENT , supra note 227, at 90.
279. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 272.
280. Id. at 272-73.
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Also, “associations regulated by social rules” allow for “relatively stable,
standardized arrangement . . . that is socially approved on the ground
(whether justified or unjustified) of its value to society.”281 In the case of the
democratic state, the freedom component of the PGC is met when the law
depends on rational consent through the frameworks of the PGC.282 Thus,
consensual procedures are required to operate within the constitutional
structure at four distinct levels: “(1) the minimal state with the criminal law,
(2) the supportive state with its need for other laws and officials, (3) its
constitutional structure providing for certain consensual decisionprocedures, [and] (4) the specific laws and officials determined by use of
these procedures.”283
“The main point of this constitutional determination by the PGC
consists of the equal distribution of the civil liberties.”284 These include
“especially the actions of speaking, publishing, and assembling and
associating with others.”285 The method of consent, however, “cannot rightly
transgress the constitution which, through the PGC provides its justification
as a procedure whose results are binding.” provided the Constitution itself is
morally justified by the PGC.286 For that to be the case, the Constitution
“must require that there be equal freedom to participate in the political
process for all members of the society, so that the civil liberties must
be equally preserved for all.”287 Here it is important to note:
[T]he equality of political participation that [the method of
consent] makes possible may be more formal than real. In
particular, differences of economic power may strongly influence
the degree of effectiveness with which different persons and
groups participate in the political process. Hence, with a view to
the equality of generic rights, it is a matter of great importance
what steps are to be taken to ensure that other serious harms are
not inflicted by those who are superior in economic or other power
on those who are inferior in these respects, and that the
opportunities available to the latter for obtaining well-being are
more nearly equalized.288

281. Id. at 274.
282. Id. at 304-06.
283. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 306.
284. Id. at 307.
285. Id. at 308.
286. Id. at 310.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 311.
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The requirement that real consent not be undermined by differences in
economic power or other power opens the door to the application of the wellbeing component of the PGC to institutions of the state in order to correct
problems of inequality wherever they may surface.
What distinguishes the minimal state from the supportive state is the
fact that it is no longer sufficient to merely protect basic and non-subtractive
well-being, as had been the case when Lochner v. New York was decided.289
Now the claim is more robust. For human rights to flourish, certain
grounding conditions represented by the PGC’s additive goods will be
necessary for the exercise and advancement of human self-fulfillment. An
example of these grounding conditions was the Court’s willingness to accept
the constitutionality of New Deal legislation following the Great Depression
of the 1930s. The purpose of this legislation was to ensure the economic and
social survival of the society.290 These grounding conditions will only
achieve their goal of ensuring social well-being, however, if the rules by
which they are administered have three kinds of content:
First, they must provide for supplying basic goods, such as food
and housing, to those who cannot obtain them by their own efforts.
Second, they must try to rectify inequalities of additive well-being
by improving the capabilities for productive work of persons who
are deficient in this respect. Education is a prime means of such
improvement, but also important is whatever strengthens family
life and enables parents to give constructive, intelligent, loving
nurture to their children. The wider diffusion of such means is a
prime component of increasing equality of opportunity. Third, the
rules must provide for various public goods that, while helping all
the members of the society, serve to increase the opportunities for
productive employment. 291
These rules, which the PGC provides for determining the structure of
the supportive state, must in the first instance govern the Legislative Branch,

289. See ACKERMAN, supra note 95, at 15 (“Courts of the Lochner era hedged their libertarian
principles with a number of exceptions, including one involving ‘protection of public morals’” so
even the limited libertarian principles were not always followed.).
290. See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 399 (upholding a minimum wage law for
women and, in effect, expanding the government’s power to regulate beyond public safety, heath,
or morals to now encompass “[t]he exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position
with respect to bargaining power and thus relatively defenseless against the denial of as living wage
. . .”).
291. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 314.
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since it is that branch which has the constitutional authority to bring these
contents into reality. Although there may be disagreement as to the best way
to bring about these conditions, so long as the methods chosen are reasonable
in that they do not violate other basic rights (as might be present in other
constitutional provisions), they should be constitutionally allowed. This is
true even if the methods should require innovations, such as the creation of
new agencies to resolve complex social and economic problems. The role
of the courts in these circumstances is to prevent only unreasonable
restrictions on the Legislature’s ability to do its job. That means that
challenges concerning legislative overreach, for instance, as with Congress
mandating health care or minimum wage requirements, must be closely
reviewed and not held invalid, so long as the needs are real and the legislative
choices are consistent with constitutional and human rights concerns. As
noted earlier, the Constitution’s legitimacy draws its authority from how well
the structures and norms that were adopted at the time of ratification continue
to fit with whatever adjustments or additions might be appropriate for
today’s moral understanding of the proper governance of the state.

VIII. Human Dignity
So far, this discussion has focused on the role that human rights
ought to play in constitutional interpretation. But what does this mean for
human dignity, which, as explained below, has already been recognized as
an important constitutional value? One might begin explaining human
dignity by distinguishing “self-respect,” as a realistic assessment of having
satisfied one’s moral obligations, from “self-esteem,” which is an
affirmation of one’s specific abilities to fulfill one’s own desires or goals.
The latter might include following a personalist morality beyond what
human rights requires.292 Dignity then, as a moral virtue, represents the selfrespect one has for oneself, and the respect one deserves from others for
satisfying reasonable moral obligations as would be required by a system of
universal morality, such as is offered by the PGC.293 Exactly how dignity
and universal morality are implicated in constitutional interpretation,
however, now needs explanation.
First, it should be noted “that dignity is a humanistic characteristic.”294
As Gewirth points out, “it is in reason and voluntariness or free will as
generic features of action that the basis of human dignity is to be found.”295

.292
293.
294.
295.

GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 227, at 94-95.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id.
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For the worth assigned to human dignity arises because humans are capable
of being the authors of their own actions, as well as being moral agents
capable of controlling their own behavior. Humans would not have much
dignity if the state did not afford them the ability to make their own choices.
Their dignity resides in their autonomy. Hence, humans properly take
ownership of their own actions, when their actions are not coerced, and,
consequently, subject themselves to praise or blame for the choices they
make. Gewirth describes this relation between dignity and authorship of
one’s own actions this way:
An ineluctable element of agent-estimated worth, then, is involved
in the very concept and context of human purposive action. Now
there is a direct route from this ascribed worth of the agent’s
purposes to the worth or dignity of the agent himself. For he is
both the general locus of all the particular purposes he wants to
attain and also the source of his attribution of worth to them.
Because he is the locus and source, he must hold that the worth he
attributes to his purposes pertains a fortiori to himself. They are
his purposes, and they are worth attaining because he is worth
sustaining and fulfilling, so that he has what for him is a justified
sense of his own worth.296
Gewirth goes on to point out that the “worth or dignity the agent
logically attributes to himself by virtue of the purposiveness of his actions,
he must also attribute to all other actual or purposive agents. For their actions
have the same general kind of purposiveness that provides the ground for his
attribution of dignity to himself.”297 Consequently, every agent, in
acknowledging she has rights to freedom and well-being, acknowledges all
other humans have these same rights. This imposes “a universalist moral
restriction on the purposes she is justified in regarding as worth pursuing,
and, hence, too, on her ascription of worth or dignity to herself.”298 It also
means that law must be sensitive to this justification and not punish the
legitimate assertion of human rights. Yet, nowhere in Gewirth’s analysis
does he suggest that the actions satisfying human rights or the presence of
human dignity are the same, or even that the latter is a derivative of the
former. Rather, what he suggests is that one’s moral dignity supervenes on
one’s possession of human rights, along with their willingness to maintain

296.
297.
298.

GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 227, at 169.
Id.
Id. at 170.
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299

rights that are consistent with the rights of others.
It is this attribution of
worth that is dialectically necessary, rather than phenomenology required.300
And it is this attribution of worth that ultimately applies to all human beings,
such that attempts by anyone, including the state, to undermine or be
indifferent to it cannot be morally justified.
Perhaps this is why human dignity has now taken hold in constitutional
interpretations. Consider Lawrence v. Texas, a case challenging a Texas
statute that imposed criminal penalties for private same-sex sexual relations
of consenting adults with no coercion or overt harm to either party.301 Justice
Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Majority in striking down the Texas
statute as unconstitutional, interpreted the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to provide this connection of human dignity to
constitutional rights:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that
is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.302
Kennedy would note later in the opinion that “[t]he petitioners are
entitled to respect for their private lives.”303 Kennedy’s Opinion in this case,
as well as the Court’s subsequent same-sex marriage decision in Obergefell
v. Hodges, suggests that efforts to preserve human rights as part of
constitutional interpretation equate with preserving human dignity at the
same level; for the constitutional protection of human rights is indeed the
constitutional protection of each person’s human dignity.

299 THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 891 (Robert Audi ed ., 2nd ed. 1999)
(“The concept of supervenience, as a relation between properties, is essentially this: Properties of
type A are supervenient on properties of type B if and only if two objects cannot differ with respect
to their A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties.”).
300 GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 227, at 169.
301 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
302 Id. at 567.
303 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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Conclusion
This Article sought to demonstrate that constitutional interpretation
must proceed on the assumption that the Constitution continues to serve as
binding higher law cross-generationally only because it continues to be
acceptable to the public. Persons who were not alive at the time the
Constitution was adopted or for several generations thereafter are, therefore,
critical to the Constitution’s success in remaining authoritative. If
constitutional values are not restricted to only what the Framers wrote or
what they may have expected from what they wrote, that success will likely
be supported. Success requires that the tradition the original Constitution
inaugurated—along with its subsequent amendments and Court
interpretations—be able to adjust to an ever-changing economic, social, and
cultural world. Incorporating new values, as may be necessary to address
concerns that the Framers did not consider nor could have anticipated, must
be part of the equation. At the same time, if there is to be an ongoing single
constitutional tradition, at least since the adoption of the Reconstruction
Amendments, it is necessary that any new values or structures are consistent
with what is already present, even if the new values should alter the level of
importance previously assigned to those that came before. Consider what
happens when a new member is brought into a family by either birth,
marriage, or adoption. The new member’s presence certainly alters the
previous members’ participation insofar as they now, if they are to remain a
harmonious family, must incorporate the new member into their familial
relationships. And the new member, especially when arriving by way of a
marriage, will find it necessary, if the family is to flourish, to adjust to at
least some of the traditions already present. The result will be that family
obligations will change; some will broaden to include the new member’s
participation, and others may become a bit more distant as the family grows
and spreads out both geographically and culturally. Yet, although it may not
have the same appearance that would have been recognized by the greatgrandparents or even the grandparents, the family remains.
A constitutional tradition is like a thriving family. If it is able to take
on new challenges, while still maintaining a healthy respect for the past, it
will thrive; otherwise, it will fail, and a new constitutional tradition will be
necessary. More importantly, if it is to remain vital, it must allow for
changes in the choice of values that are emphasized when circumstances
require. Much of this Article has attempted to address this question by
incorporating a set of human rights values, along with an equally important
set of conflicts of rights, principles that hopefully would be supportable
cross-generationally. The Supreme Court must now determine whether it
will adopt this approach to constitutional legitimacy, and to the American
public whether it will make the Constitution succeed or fail.

